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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

CAPITALIZATION OF GREEN SPACE AND WATER QUALITY INTO
RESIDENTIAL HOUSING VALUES

This thesis investigates how proximity to parks, historic district designations, and
water quality are valued at residential housing prices. The first essay argues that the
negative influences of parks and historic districts, if not noticed, could promote negative
externalities and unincentivized investments. I find a negative impact on housing values
for a close proximity to a park, suggesting disamenities in park features. When the
boundary discontinuity and park amenities are considered, I find a positive valuation for a
park. Overall, these results imply a mixed influence of parks on homeowners. From the
historic district standpoint, I find a positive valuation of the local historic districts over the
surrounding neighborhoods. The latter findings indicate that the benefits of locally
designated areas outweigh the negative impacts. The second essay researches a probable
lead risk in the water supply on the residential market. I argue strongly for the possibility
of hidden-type information relative to lead in water supplies. I find that the influence of
lead risk in their water supply is not statistically significant. The test for asymmetric
information validates the expectation that homes in the relatively high lead-risk
neighborhoods might not be informed of the level of lead-risk in their water supply.
KEYWORDS: Parks, Historic Districts, Hedonic Price, Water Quality, Lead Risk,
Information Asymmetries

_________

_ Willie B. Bedell

___________November 27, 2017

1

CAPITALIZATION OF GREEN SPACE AND WATER QUALITY INTO
RESIDENTIAL HOUSING VALUES

By
Willie B. Bedell

_________Dr. Steven Buck _
Director of Thesis

_________Dr Carl R. Dillon_
Director of Graduate Studies

_______ November 27, 2017_

2

DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my mother, Marie Johnson and siblings, Rammie,
Jocee, Devine, and Johnson, for their family love and affection.

3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, this thesis was written through funding and scholastic
opportunities provided by the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of
Kentucky. In this, I would like to thank the offices of the Department Chair, through Dr.
Leigh Maynard, and the Director of Graduate Studies, through Dr. Carl Dillon.

I thank my advisor, Dr. Steven Buck, Assistant Professor of Agricultural
Economics for his mentorship, the graduate experience provided, and reviews that
improved this thesis. Much appreciation is also shown to my thesis committee, including
Dr. Jill Stowe, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Dr. Jack Schieffer for
their technical assistance, comments, and reviews that greatly supported the thesis.

I would also like to show gratitude to David O'Neill, Fayette County, Kentucky
Property Valuation Administrator, for the provision of the data covering the residential
market. This dataset was essential to the analysis of this research.

Finally, I thank all faculty, staff, and colleagues in the Department of Agricultural
Economics at the University of Kentucky. They contributed directly and indirectly to this
thesis through lectures, seminars, graduate supports, and the provision of logistics.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER TWO: HEDONIC VALUATION OF GREEN SPACE IN FAYETTE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY: INVESTIGATING PARKS AND HISTORICAL DISTRICTS
............................................................................................................................................. 5
I.

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6

II.

Background .......................................................................................................... 8

III.

Literature Review ............................................................................................... 12

A. Parks Hedonic Review ....................................................................................... 13
B. Historic District in the Hedonic Literature ......................................................... 16
IV.

The Conceptual Hedonic Model ........................................................................ 20

V. Data ........................................................................................................................ 24
A. Housing Characteristics and Time Data ............................................................. 24
B. Neighborhood Attributes Data ........................................................................... 26
C. Parks and Historic Districts Data ....................................................................... 28
VI.

Econometric Specifications ................................................................................ 30

VII.

Result.................................................................................................................. 33

A. Park Hedonic Results ......................................................................................... 34
B. Historic District Regressions Results ................................................................. 38
VIII.

Discussion and Implications ........................................................................... 41

A. Parks: Mitigating Negative Externalities ........................................................... 41
B. Historic District: Investment Analysis ............................................................... 43
IX.

Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 44

X. Tables ..................................................................................................................... 47
XI.

Figures ................................................................................................................ 55

CHAPTER THREE: WILLINGNESS TO AVOID LEAD RISK IN WATER QUALITY:
ARE THERE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES? ........................................................ 59
I.
II.

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 60
Background ........................................................................................................ 63
iv

III.

Literature Review ............................................................................................... 67

A. Hedonic Valuation of Water Quality ................................................................. 68
B. Non-Hedonic Valuation of Residential Water Supply ....................................... 69
IV.

Economic Model ................................................................................................ 71

V. Data ........................................................................................................................ 75
A. Lead Risk Data in the Context of Fayette Kentucky .......................................... 75
B. Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Data .............................................. 77
C. Analyzing Neighborhood Characteristics by Relative Lead Exposure Risk ...... 79
VI.

Empirical Estimation .......................................................................................... 79

A. Hedonic Valuation of Lead Risk Phase.............................................................. 80
B. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Water Quality Phase ........................... 83
VII.

Result.................................................................................................................. 84

A. Water Lead-Risk Influence on Residential Housing Price................................. 85
B. Asymmetric Information in Water Quality ........................................................ 89
VIII.
IX.

Conclusion and Implications .......................................................................... 90
Tables ................................................................................................................. 92

X. Figures.................................................................................................................... 98
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 102
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 107
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 111

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of the Continuous Variables of Structural Attributes and
Distance to Parks............................................................................................................... 47
Table 2.2. Comparing Residential Homes that have Access-to-Park to Homes located
Across-the-Street............................................................................................................... 48
Table 2.3. Hedonic Estimates of Park: Findings of Distance to Nearest Park Analysis ... 49
Table 2.4. Hedonic Estimates of Park: The Inclusion of Park Fixed Effects to Nearest
Distance............................................................................................................................. 51
Table 2.5. Hedonic Estimates of Direct Access-to-Park: Boundary Design Regression. 53
Table 2.6. Hedonic Estimates of Historic District using Boundary Design Regression... 54
Table 3.1. Summary Statistic of Continuous Variables of Structural Attributes, Median
Household Income and Water Lead-Risk Levels. ............................................................ 92
Table 3.2. Comparative Summary Statistics of Water Lead-Risk Treatment and Control
Groups ............................................................................................................................... 93
Table 3.3. Estimates of Hedonic Model (OLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water Quality . 94
Table 3.4. Estimates of Hedonic Model (2SLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water Quality 95
Table 3.5. Propensity Score Matching Results for Treated Groups (High-Risk Areas) ... 96
Table 3.6. Balance Table for the Covariate Matching ...................................................... 96
Table 3.7. Testing for Asymmetric Information via the Average Appreciation Rates
between High and Low Water Lead-Risk Communities. ................................................. 97

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Fayette County, Kentucky Residential Transactions, 2000 to 2017 .............. 55
Figure 2.2. Fayette County, Kentucky Neighborhood Map, 2000 to 2017 ...................... 56
Figure 2.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Parks and Historical District Map, 2000 to 2017 57
Figure 2.4. Quadratic Plot of Park Distance in Kilometer ................................................ 58
Figure 3.1. Depicting the Assumption of Water Quality Information Asymmetries........ 98
Figure 3.2. Lead Risk Layers in Fayette County, Kentucky ............................................. 99
Figure 3.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Attributes Map ................................................... 100
Figure 3.4. Plotting the Matching between the Treatment and Control Groups (Water
Lead-Risk)....................................................................................................................... 101

vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
It is easy to recognize environmental issues when the media relay news on climate change,
smog cities, polluted water supplies, and cancer-inducing elements in our communities.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, investigates how parks and historic districts
influence the values of residential homes. Chapter 3 examines the impact a probable lead
contamination level in the water supply has on residential properties. Empirically, I used
hedonic valuation throughout this thesis to obtain parks, historic districts, and water lead
risks' implicit values.
The green space campaign aims to protect the environment, thus supporting other
forms of life and caring for the environment. Parks are financed and expected to support
health and to conserve green spaces for future generations. However, parks can face
challenges or cause negative externalities, Walls (2009) and APA (2017). The environment
is also maintained through historic districts. Historic districts are likely to boost
environmental conservation, sustainability, reduce pollution, and support energy-efficient
policies, Rocchi (2015). Nevertheless, designated areas could face challenges of radical
change. Historic districts could adversely affect conservation goals and property
investments. These designated areas could also displace low-income residents, Clark and
Herrin (1997) and Fein (1985). In addition to investigating green space, this thesis
evaluates the issue of lead poisoning risk. Lead poisoning in the United States has been an
environmental and health case since the mid-1950s. Contemporarily, lead contaminations
in water supplies became a trending issue because of the Flint, Michigan water crisis in
2014. Some of the main challenges of lead contamination remained identifying sources of
lead materials and financing water infrastructures to mitigate lead risks in water supplies.
1

To measure the values or influences of these environmental issues on homeowners,
for which there exist no established markets, I subscribe to the hedonic model. Important
to the environmental and natural resource discipline, the hedonic analysis is employed to
measure environmental goods. Hedonic analysis connects environmental goods, services,
or concerns as linked attributes to a market. By this association, an implicit value is
revealed. For example, the hedonic approach has been used to estimate how people value
environmental issues like air pollution, noise level, and water quality via the residential
property market. The hedonic model, which links Chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis, combines
structural, neighborhood, and environmental variables to measure parks and historic
districts' implicit values, as well as lead risk levels in the water supply. Not only is the
hedonic model a consolidating force for my essays, but also the dataset covering the
residential market of Fayette County, Kentucky. The Property Valuation Administrator of
Fayette County, Kentucky made available the dataset of over 90,000 observations. This
dataset, from which I measured the influences of parks, historic districts, and water quality
levels, date from 2000 to 2016. I merged the PVA data to other secondary information and
my environmental variables of interest from Fayette County, Kentucky to support the
application of the hedonic model.
Chapter 2 concentrates on examining parks and historic districts hedonic values. I
employed an ordinary least squares regression to evaluate the influences of parks and
historic districts on residential homes. I also applied a boundary discontinuity procedure to
estimates parks and historic districts’ values via properties that lie in the same geographical
neighborhoods. The ordinary least squares technique finds a negative implicit value for
parks. This result indicates that parks host amenities which might negatively affect their
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use-value. The boundary discontinuity results find a positive value for parks, indicating a
positive use-value. Applying the hedonic model to analyze designated areas, I also find
that local historic districts have a positive influence on the residential market. This implies
that local historic districts have benefits and exert a greater influence on the surrounding
neighborhoods.
In Chapter 3, I discussed the problem of identifying lead risk in the residential water
supply. My argument is segmented into two phases. The first phase assessed the probable
water lead risks impact on residential homes’ values. The second phase tested the argument
that homeowners in the high lead risk water zones may have little information on their
water supply, compared to the low lead risk neighborhoods. Results from the ordinary least
squares and instrumental variable approaches show no statistical difference to avoid water
lead risks. Results from the propensity score matching find that people will pay a higher
price to live in a low-risk water neighborhood. The latter result might be susceptible to
omitted variable bias. These results further reflect that homeowners care more about the
home’s structural characteristics and neighborhoods’ income levels than lead risks. Results
from the second phase show that the average growth rate for homes in the high lead risk
areas is greater than the low-risk neighborhoods. The average growth rate is the appreciated
price from the resales of residential homes. This growth rate results imply that home buyers
in the high-risk areas might be less informed about lead risk.
My essays contribute to the literature by investigating the combined implicit effects
of park amenities and historical districts, assessing the hedonic value of a probable lead
exposure risk in drinking water, and testing for the possibility of lead risk asymmetric
information in the residential market. I identified potential gaps and provided
3

recommendations to support current policies addressing these environmental issues. I
recommend that parks' authorities use surveys to detect and mitigate the negative parks
externalities. Besides, I call on historic district authorities to adopt communications and
actions which could combat gentrification and support societal, environmental, and
economic integration. In the vein of lead risk, I suggest that water and related authorities
should ensure that water-lead problems are fully disclosed during the sales of residential
homes, in conjunction with the lead paint full-disclosure regulations.

4

CHAPTER TWO: HEDONIC VALUATION OF GREEN SPACE IN FAYETTE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY: INVESTIGATING PARKS AND HISTORICAL
DISTRICTS
Parks are green spaces which might promote health, recreational benefits, and private
investments. A historic designation can indicate high-quality craftsmanship with durable
materials and an attractive aesthetic. I investigate the influences of parks and historic
district designations on homeowners. Using data provided by the Property Valuation
Administrator of Fayette County, Kentucky, I employ a hedonic analysis to investigate the
implicit values of parks and historic districts. I find mixed valuations for parks and report
a positive influence associated with historic districts.

5

I.

Introduction

Parks play a key role in the drive for green space and the accompanying environmental
attributes. Parks, which are financed to bring recreation benefits and social life to
communities, are valued for their amenities. To depict a financing picture for parks,
Lexington government in Fayette County, Kentucky assigned $1,542,000 in funds and
$2,955,000 in Bonds for the 2016/2017 Fiscal Year to the Parks and Recreation for
maintenance and development projects. In view of designated areas, homeowners residing
in historic districts may enjoy environmentally friendly homes, tax incentives, and
investment benefits. To provide an investment picture for historic districts, homeowners
residing in historic districts in the State of Kentucky had invested, on average, $123,537 in
historic properties by 2015. These investments, to some extent, are tied to Federal, State,
and local tax benefits, such as preservation tax deductions. Specifically, I ask the research
question: How does proximity to a park and historical district designation affect residential
housing values? I expect that parks and historic district designations would positively
influence the values of residential homes.
This study contributes to the green space or environmental valuation literature by
investigating two environmental attributes that exist in the same spatial scope. Studies have
independently measured the value of parks and historic districts using willingness to pay
analyses. Livy and Klaiber (2010) examined the values of amenities in parks, as parks
change over time. Although their results showed mixed valuation for parks, the authors
argued that nearness to a park is not highly valued and ignoring heterogeneity in park
amenities is not advisable. Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010), using a utility sorting model, show
that the housing market, a component of location, structure, and time, is necessary to
6

analyze open space. Livy and Klaiber (2010) find that utility maximization of open space
depends on the location and the open space type. In the realm of historic district literature,
Clark and Herrin (1997) emphasized that historic preservation strategy is employed by
cities’ authorities to revive declining metropolitan areas and support renewed interest in
designated areas. Clark and Herrin evidently show that historic district put forth a net
positive effect on the residential property. Coulson and Lahr’s (2005) findings showed a
higher value for properties in historical designations: Local designations have a positive
and significant effect, while national historic districts have a non-significant effect on
residential properties. Regardless of studies showing the positive effects of historically
designated areas, scholarships like Heudorfer (1975) and Gale (1991) find a neutral or
negative influence of historic district on properties. Fein (1985) sees historic districts as a
commitment to preserve city neighborhoods for the privileged, claiming a gentrification
phenomenon.
My study is theoretically underpinned by the hedonic framework. The hedonic
model is built on the pioneering theories and assumptions of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen
(1974). Lancaster argues that consumption activities produce a vector of characteristics and
individuals will optimally choose the solution that maximizes their utilities for the
characteristics. Rosen (1974) supports the hedonic theory by explaining that differentiated
products consist of a vector of objective measurable characteristics. Hedonic prices show
implicit prices of assigned characteristics, as reveal to consumers by sellers. Aligning the
hedonic theory to this study, the value of residential homes depends not only on the
structural characteristics but also on the neighborhood and environmental attributes. As a
result, hedonic prices will implicitly show the values for parks and historic districts. The
7

dataset used in this study incorporates information on home sales transactions, house
characteristics, and neighborhood and environmental attributes. My dataset for this essay
consists of 64,727 observations. The dataset was built on the residential housing market in
Fayette County, Kentucky and it covered a 17-year period, 2000 to 2016. Fayette County,
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) is the main source of my data.
Accumulating information from different data sources, I mapped and merged all data using
the Quantum Geo-information system (QGIS) software. Hence, I regress the log of the sale
price on the structural, neighborhood, and environmental attributes to accurately evaluate
the impact of parks and historic districts on the residential market. Herein, I used a
covariate approach for my identification strategy. The inclusion of covariates (time fixed
effects, housing & neighborhood attributes, as well as school and park fixed effects) are
presented in a stepwise approach. Results from the hedonic models steered the stage for
the implications and discussions.
The organization of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
background of the study; Section 3 reviews park and historic district studies; Section 4 and
5 respectively describe the theoretical model and the data; Section 6 hosts the designs of
my econometric model, and Section 7 reveals the empirical findings. The study is finalized
in Section 8 and 9, where I discussed my findings and provide a conclusion.
II.

Background

Fayette County, Kentucky provides a green space and urban-rural context that this study
exploits to evaluate Fayette County, Kentucky provides a green space and urban-rural
context that this study exploits to evaluate the use-value of environmental attributes,
8

namely park features, and historically designated areas. In Fayette County, Kentucky,
green space is contextualized as a heritage to environmental amenities, including
interwoven qualities of urban-rural landscapes, farmsteads, lands, parks, trees, and water
networks. Green space in Fayette County, Kentucky has positive externalities that directly
benefits tourism, businesses, and the public. Supported by Kentucky’s State statutes, there
are Comprehensive plans that serve as guidelines to maintain green space and to enhance
economic growth and land use management in Fayette County, Kentucky. Fayette County,
Kentucky’s 2007 and 2013 Comprehensive plans project environmental and neighborhood
goals that are built on the frameworks of protecting, promoting, and designing open space
and green infrastructure, and monitoring and strategizing to reduce pollutions of air water,
light, and noise. These Plans guide both sellers and buyers of residential, commercial, and
industrial properties in Fayette County, Kentucky to acknowledge land preservation and to
promote green infrastructures. Specifically, environmental goals in these plans drive
sustainability in parks and designated districts. Fayette County, Kentucky consists of more
than 100 parks and 17 historic districts. Parks in Fayette County, Kentucky are highly
variable in types, sizes, recreational facilities, and provide support to communities’
livelihood activities. Local historical districts are dispersed throughout Fayette County,
Kentucky. These historic neighborhoods also exhibit variability. Illustratively, historically
designated areas in Fayette County, Kentucky can be found close to the central business
district or within suburban neighborhoods.
Parks and historic districts play a key role in green space campaigns. Ideally, parks
are appreciated for the usefulness of their amenities. Nationwide, park types, for instance,
community, neighborhood, and golf-course parks have associated positive externalities,
9

NRPA (2017). Community parks represent health and a diversified community space.
Neighborhood parks contribute to recreation and physical activities. Golf-course parks are
noted for their relaxing environment, green fields, rolling hills, streams and recreational
activities; State-owned parks offer positive activities ranging from hiking and picnicking
to wildlife habitat management and recreational use. In the same spirit of exhibiting
positive externalities, there are benefits of establishing and living in local historic areas.
Designated districts support environmentally friendly homes, counting energy efficient
residents, enjoying socio-psychological benefits, and protecting residential investments,
Rocchi (2015) and O'Donnell (1998). Historic districts encourage communities to retain
and use their existing resources in an effort to contribute to the reduction of pollution,
congestion, and landfill waste. In the intentions of improving the environment, historic
districts may allow communities to incorporate and exercise environmental stewardship
and contribute to emergency management decisions, FEMA (2017). Homeowners within
historic districts may qualify for tax incentives, as derived from the total value of expenses
incurred when preserving the property.
Despite the positive externalities associated with parks and historic districts, there
exist problems that could counteract or negatively alter the importance of these green space
amenities. Regarding parks, a community park might breed societal challenges such as
gangs,

drugs,

gun violence and noise,

APA (2017). Under-utilization

and

underperformances have raised critical concerns for neighborhood parks, Alliances (2017).
Despite the benefits from golf course parks, there might be right of entry, admission fees,
and an accompanying property tax. State-owned parks are afflicted with taxes, neglected
maintenance, and increased wildfires, State Owned Reservations (2017). Regarding
10

historic districts, the nightmare of either gentrification or neglect investment is a problem
which could hinder investments and positive influences in designated districts. Through
gentrification, historic districts may only host residents of middle and upper-middle-class
families, Clark and Herrin (1997) and Fein (1985). There are also potential consequences
of high maintenance costs and building code regulations that may cause a prisoner’s
dilemma-like interaction, wherein historic property owners are not motivated to invest in
their property maintenance, Coulson and Lahr (2005).
In spite of challenges that could be encountered or widened by parks and historic
districts, I concentrate on the question: How does proximity to a park and historical district
designation affect residential housing values? I hypothesize that parks and historic districts
have positive influences on residential homeowners, because the locals who utilize parks’
amenities and live in historic districts might enjoy environmental benefits, as well as public
and private investments. My objective of this green space research is to empirically assess
the influences of parks and historic districts on residential properties’ values. I used the
residential market to establish the measure of influence and determine the implicit usevalues for parks and historic districts. Use-value reflects utilities and externalities
associated with environmental goods or issues.
The massive support toward parks, including projects for development and
infrastructure maintenance, is one of the forces backing the study's motivation. Funds for
parks are disbursed on playgrounds, outdoor fitness facilities, buildings, and beautification
of gardens. In the context of Fayette County, Kentucky, financing parks bring recreational
and event benefits, such as afterschool activities, arts and sports, camps, rental facilities,
and tourism to residents, Park and Recreation (2017). During 2016/2017 Fiscal Year,
11

Fayette County, Kentucky government allocated $1,542,000 in funds to the county’s Parks
and Recreation for maintenance and replacement of outdated parks equipment. Also, the
2017 Fiscal Year designates $2,955,000 in Bond for major repairs and improvements of
parks. These funds support projects such as the construction of amphitheaters and aquatic
centers in existing parks, the designs of proposed parks, and the renovation of playgrounds.
My expectation for historic district valuation is motivated by an investment factor.
There are approximately 85,014 historic places listed, with over 13,594 historic districts in
the United States. The 2016 Fiscal Year Annual Report of the Federal Tax Incentives for
Rehabilitating Historical Districts reported an aggregate investment of 1,039 certified
completed projects valued at $5.85 billion. 57% of these completed projects invested in
private housing. For example, by 2015, 832 historic rehabilitation projects were reviewed
in Kentucky through the Historic Preservation Tax Credit program. In monetary value,
private investments contributed $647,260,922 to historic rehabilitation. On average,
residential homeowners in the State of Kentucky had invested $123,537 in historic
properties. Kentucky Heritage Council consolidates with the Governor and the
Preservation Officer to administer Kentucky Preservation Historic Tax Credit program.
III.

Literature Review

Hedonic analysis has been instrumental to the discipline of environmental economics,
assisting the discipline to value environmental goods. Ridker and Henning (1967) first used
the hedonic approach to calculate the significance of air pollution sulfation and its
actionable effects on changing property values. Thereafter, environmental studies have
applied the hedonic analysis to research noise level, Bjorner et al. (1992), woodland cover,
12

Garrod and Willis (1992), and water quality, Leggett and Bockstael (2000), Rubinfeld
(1978), and Brookshire et al. (1981). I contribute to the hedonic literature by investigating
the combined implicit effects of park amenities and historical districts on property values.
A. Parks Hedonic Review
Livy and Klaiber (2010) scrutinized park amenity values, as parks change over time. The
authors re-echoed the unexpected findings that are sometimes associated with park
amenities: Residential homeowners will offer a discount to live near a park. Livy and
Klaiber warned that if a research is not robust, the research might not carefully observe the
bundling hypothesis of parks. Livy and Klaiber argued that, when evaluating park as an
environmental good, the aggregate result of proximity to a park is a bundle of positive and
negative attributes. Livy and Klaiber (2010) contribute to the literature by way of their
investigation which focused on the non-significant statistical results associated with studies
on parks, the effects of heterogeneity in park amenities, and the consistency of depreciated
values of park amenities over time. I agree with Livy and Klaiber on the notion that each
park and its fulfilling amenities require different upkeep attention and that each park is
viewed and valued distinctly through the public eyes. Like many traditional hedonic
studies, their general model features the first stage hedonic price of a semi-log functional
form. Livy and Klaiber (2010) assumptions hold that the hedonic model envelopes a vector
of structural characteristics, neighborhood attributes, local park amenities, and time. Using
data from the Maryland Property View and Baltimore County Park Renovation between
2000 and 2007, Livy and Klaiber applied fixed effects parsimonious models. Their specific
model controlled for housing characteristics, neighborhood attributes, parks’ facilities
renovated or maintained at a fixed location, and the depreciation effect through time.
13

Results from the Census Tract, Block group, and property fixed effect models, as
constructed by Livy and Klaiber (2010), show that nearness to a park is not highly valued
and ignoring heterogeneity in park amenities is not advisable. Their findings report that
playground and field renovation have positive and significant estimates, while courts and
lighting renovation have negative positive and significant estimates. Park trails did not
yield a statistically significant result. Livy and Klaiber attributed the negative significant
coefficients to noise, light pollution, increased usage of amenities, and increased nighttime activities. Contrariwise, Livy and Klaiber credited the positive and significant
coefficients to safer infrastructures, increased desirability by families, and park’s green
space.
Valuing park allows one to quickly realize the non-market nature of environmental
goods, including green and open spaces. The solution to this probing technique is structured
in an existing nearby market. The residential market, depicting models of household
location choice, is foundational for measuring the willingness to pay for environmental
goods, Kuminoff and Pope (2010). Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010) use a utility sorting model
to show that the housing market, a component of location, structure, and time, is necessary
to analyze open space. A focusing element for consistently and accurately identifying the
willingness to pay for park amenities is to control for heterogeneity. Although their study
is skewed to policy interventions and open space conversation, Klaiber and Smith (2013)
contribute to the literature by emphasizing on the identification of heterogeneity in
amenities. Accounting for amenities’ heterogeneities might explain the locational decision
trade-offs that households make to experience optimal utilization. Klaiber and Phaneuf
(2010) conceptual sorting model is built on the basic random utility model. That is, each
14

household decides to maximize its utility by the house type, spatial location, time, and other
neighborhood and observable attributes. Households classify and choose among their local
jurisdictions to get the desired public good. They employed a two-stage empirical strategy
to recover household heterogeneity and price coefficient. In the context of the Twin Cities
of Minnesota (i.e., the Seven-County area) the data presents a case of variability in the
types of open space. With the aggregate information constructed on the subsets of a
household choice set, residential transaction, land use, and Census data from 1990 and
2000, the data included property values and characteristics, landscape amenities, and the
socioeconomic characteristics of households. The authors matched and mapped spatially
explicit landscape data to a real estate transaction. Their conclusive results, in part,
prioritize the analysis of heterogeneity for open space type and preferences. Their findings
show that utility maximization of open space decisively depends on location and type.
The hedonic model and willingness to pay estimators are seriously plagued with
endogeneity issues. The hedonic functional forms might either accurately or inaccurately
estimate the willingness to pay for environmental attributes. With the intention of choosing
the right functional model for environmental inference, Kuminoff et al. (2010) questioned
which hedonic functional forms are appropriate to evaluate the economic effect of policies
which target local public goods, environmental services, and urban amenities. Motivated
by Cropper et al. (1988), Kuminoff et al. (2010) investigated misspecification caused by
omitted variable bias in the hedonic model. The challenge of omitted variable bias exists
when factors that are important to explain the price, neighborhood characteristics, and
environmental variables, such as park features, and designated characteristics, are not
observed in the function. This endogeneity issue might lead to an inaccurate estimate of
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economic values. Kuminoff et al. (2010) constructed a Monte Carlo experiment to probe
the accuracy of hedonic functional forms in the quest to mitigate the problem of omitted
variable bias. Their Monte Carlo analysis included six functional forms, namely linear,
semi-log, double-log, quadratic, linear Box-Cox, and quadratic Box-Cox. The
characteristic vectors, as used by Kuminoff et al. (2010), encompassed the structural
housing attributes, idiosyncratic income, locational preferences, and proximity to open
space. They calibrated the model to a data of 104,000 single family housing sales in Wake
County, North Carolina between 1992 and 2000. Their findings advised studies to
incorporate spatial fixed effects to mitigate the danger of omitted variable bias. Unlike
previous findings, their results show that with the spatial fixed effect control, a flexible
specification like the quadratic Box-Cox outperforms the parsimonious linear, semi-linear,
and double log functional forms. Kuminoff et al. (2010)’s work is distinct to the hedonic
literature by virtue of its advice that studies should carefully think about the hedonic
specifications, account for endogeneity, and encourage the usage of fixed spatial effect,
time dummy, and quasi-experiment models.
B. Historic District in the Hedonic Literature
The body of literature covering historic district influence on property valuation has found
mixed evidence of positive and negative effects. Clark and Herrin (1997) argued that
historic preservation is a tactful strategy employed by cities’ authorities to revive declining
metropolitan areas and support renewed interest in a designated area. Hence, historic
districts host residents of middle and upper-middle-class families (gentrification) and
preserve a municipality’s tax benefits by encouraging renovation of the residential and
commercial properties. The authors use the hedonic price theory on a sample of residential
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properties in Sacramento, California to investigate whether positive externalities from a
historic preservation designation outweigh the potential negative impacts of a cumbersome
set of rules imposed by authorities. Living in a historically preserved district in the United
States comes with straight regulations of making an alteration to properties to promote
health, safety, and welfare. Clark and Herrin also warned that preservation plans and
regulations, which require homeowners to improve deteriorating properties, may not be
sufficient to incentivize the property upkeep. As a result, the property value will decrease
due to strict rules. The higher cost of renovation could also overwhelm the positive upkeep
campaign in historic districts. Fitting the data to 20 historic districts, Clark and Herrin
(1997) used a single stage hedonic price model, which viewed housing as a differentiated
bundle of structural and neighborhood characteristics. Clark & Herrin assumed information
symmetries, zero transaction cost, and a continuous offering of attributes. Their model
specified the structural, neighborhood, year, and historic preservation influences on home
price through a semi-log functional form to avoid misspecification biases. Clark and Herrin
included a control through the interactions of the historic district dummy with the age of
the house, and neighborhoods that are in a close proximity to the historic district. The latter
covariate may explain the spillover effect of a historic district on nearby properties.
Applying the white test correction technique, Clark and Herrin's findings show that historic
district put forth a net positive effect on the residential property; a historic district increases
the average home sale price by 25 percent. Notwithstanding, they also conclude that the
success of the historic district is strongly predicted by the characteristics of the
neighborhood.
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Leichenko et al. (2000) also agreed that designated areas are used as instruments to
rejuvenate or to halt neighborhoods deterioration. Leichenko et al. questioned the mixed
results of the effect of designated areas on property values: Evidence of positive or
detracting values. The positive effects of historic districts contain insurance for a better
neighborhood quality and a positive spillover effect for neighboring areas. The value
detracting aspects include a restriction on alteration and demolition, as well as expensive
maintenance. These authors contribute to the literature by examining the effects of historic
districts on property values across a larger set of cities, a limitation of previous studies.
Their appraisal data contained information from nine cities (Abilene, Dallas, Fort Worth,
Grapevine, Laredo, Lubbock, San Antonio, Nacogdoches, and San Marcos), hosting over
6,000 historic properties. Leichenko et al. designed selection criteria for comparable and
different types of historic districts. Their modeling approach estimated house price as a
function of property characteristics, neighborhood location, and historic status. Like Clark
and Herrin (1997), Leichenko et al. (2000) used a semi-log hedonic specification form of
the natural log of price and included a control of the interaction of the historic district with
year built to avoid upward bias. Mainly, their results suggested that historic district
generally has a positive impact on property values, and historic area is associated with
average property value increases ranging between five (5) and twenty percent (20) of the
total property value. Their results also indicated that historic district, whether national, state
or local, tend to have a mixed effect on housing values.
The formation and support of designated districts is a prevalent tool to preserve
cultural heritage through external stimuli such as the 20% national tax credit program.
Coulson and Lahr (2005), influence this paper via their emphasis on the potential
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ramifications of historic districts. Coulson and Lahr stressed on the negative effects that
might deter the interest, influence, and investment in a historic district. Constraints of living
in a designated district include the types of refurbishment and rehabilitation that can be
undertaken, upkeep maintenance, and building code regulations. The authors framed the
constraint scenario into a prisoner’s dilemma-like interaction, wherein property owners
aren’t incentivized to invest in their property maintenance. Over time, neighbors may copy
the low-level investment strategy, thus causing a downward spiral of quality on housing
stock in the district. As a result, the neighborhood is made worse-off through low
investment. Covering the period 1998 to 2002 and sourced through Memphis Landmarks
Commissions, Coulson and Lahr’s (2005) data included 5,889 observations from historic
districts and historic conservation zones. Results from a series of models show that
historical designations add 12.6 percent to the property appreciation process. Further
evidence shows that local designations have a positive and significant effect, while results
belonging to national historic districts were not statistically significant. Another interesting
finding by Coulson and Lahr, segmenting historic district into old and new properties, show
that new properties benefit more than older properties in a historic district.
Other studies covering designated areas have solely debated that historic districts,
though with plans to mitigate neighborhood negative externalities, are believed to depress
property values. In this light, difference-in-difference studies report neutral or negative
effects on property values by designated districts, Heudorfer (1975), New York Landmarks
Conservancy (1977), Samuels (1981), and Gale (1991). Fein (1985) perceived historic
district as a commitment to preserve city neighborhoods for the privileged. The sociojudiciary notes, published in the New York University Law Review, stressed that historic
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district has the tendency to displace or exclude low-income and minority residents from
urban neighborhoods; a gentrification phenomenon.
IV.

The Conceptual Hedonic Model

The theoretical framework in this essay is underpinned by the hedonic model. The hedonic
model is built on the pioneering theories and assumptions of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen
(1974). A central assumption instantiated by these theorists is the characteristics rationale.
Lancaster (1966) consumer theory reflects that goods are goods in a substitution
determinate world and inputs’ output is a collection of characteristics. Lancaster argued
that goods hold characteristics and characteristics give rise to utility; goods have more
characteristics, and combined goods possess varying utilities than separate goods. In
addition to these arguments, Lancaster (1966) modeled consumer behavior on three basic
assumptions. First, Lancaster assumes individual good or a collection of goods is a
consumption activity which is associated with the level of activity. It is also assumed that
the level of activities associated with a consumer good is linear, objective, and carry
intrinsic properties in relation to technology. The second assumption present that
consumption activities produce a vector of characteristics in a linear relationship. And
lastly, individual possess an ordinal utility function on characteristics and will optimally
choose the solution that maximizes his utility for the characteristics.
Fk(z, x) = 0, k = 1…m

(1)

The model in Equation 1 maintains a no one-to-one relationship between the activity
vector, indexed by k, and the collections of characteristics z and x that available to the
consumers.
20

Rosen (1974) strongly supports the hedonic theory through his explanation that
differentiated products consist of a vector of objective measurable characteristics. In his
argument, an observed product price and the tied characteristics signify the hedonic price.
One of the main assumptions of Rosen’s implicit prices is market equilibrium. In the
consumer domain, the price that consumers will be willing to pay for a good, the
consumption decision, indicates utility maximization subject to a nonlinear budget
constraint. Choosing a basket of goods to maximize satisfaction, consumers will purchase
a product that has a unique combination of characteristics to achieve optimal utility.
P(z) = U(x, z1,…zn; α, y)

(2)

Equation 2 sums the consumption decision into the consumer bid function, where z is the
product characteristics, x is all other goods consumed, y is constraint income, and α is the
taste parameter that varies with each consumer. Regarding the production decision, each
producer, acting independently, consider the number of units to produce and the package
of specific characteristics to assemble in a locational space.
P(z) = C(M, z1,…zn; ẞ)

(3)

As projected in Equation 3, producers want to maximize profit by choosing the
optimal cost of the number of units to produce M and the specific characteristics to include,
z. These are based on the factor prices and other production parameters, ẞ. So, the market
equilibrium combines buyers and seller’s goals through a hedonic price function. Goods
have stated prices, valued by sellers, and goods are associated with a fixed characteristic
vector, valued by consumers. Thus, setting the stage for the implicit price function, the
hedonic function.
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P(z) = p(z1,…zn)

(4)

Analyzing the theories of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) in the application of
this study, the residential market in Fayette County, Kentucky is a bundle of defined
characteristics. Fayette County, Kentucky’s housing market reflects characteristics that are
orderly valued indirectly in different relative proportions. Recall, the residential market
serves as a medium to measure the implicit use-value of environmental goods. Homes
package characteristics like structural, neighborhood, environmental, and time attributes.
Because households’ attractions in Fayette County, Kentucky are influenced by these
characteristics, benefits from parks and historic districts in the county might be captured
by each household.
Ui = (P, H, N, E, T, ε)

(5)

In Equation 5, utilities enjoyed by household i in Fayette County, Kentucky encompass the
market clearing price of the home P, housing characteristics H, neighborhood and
environmental attributes N and E, macro-fiscal time reflected in T, and unobservables ε.
Note that, the utility function accounts for heterogeneity in the preferential valuation of
homes, such as choosing a to live in a historic district or close to a park. The varying
characteristics of parks, such as hosting a trail or community center, and if a historic district
is in a central business district or on the rural side of Fayette County, Kentucky, might
contain different utilities, thus giving rise to different preferences.
In the market equilibrium situation, homeowners in the Fayette County, Kentucky
have a bid function that manifests their willingness to accept the household expenditures
and to pay for a given utility at a relative budget. Separately, home sellers in Fayette
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County, Kentucky are sensitive to their locational decision and the package of
characteristics assembled. Revealed by the household market clearing price, the hedonic
price function implicitly displays the value of characteristics.
P = f (H1,…,Hm; T1,…,Tn, N1,…,Nm; E1,…,Ep, ε)

(6)

The expression of attributes like H1,…, Hm and E1,…, Ep accounts for the number of
characteristics associated with each attribute vector. This also allows for heterogeneous
preferences, Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010).
Summed up, the hedonic theory explains that a commodity is a wrapped bundle of
characteristics. The value of residential homes depends not only on the structural
characteristics of the home but also on the neighborhood and environmental attributes. The
hedonic price function is traditionally linear, or it may be nonlinear, so that implicit prices
can vary with the level of characteristics, Hanley et al. (2007). The hedonic theory assumes
information symmetries, low transaction cost, unlimited attributes, and an unsegmented
market. These assumptions are potential empirical concerns for the hedonic model. Even
accounting for these assumptions, the hedonic model is susceptible to empirical pitfalls,
including omitted variable bias, multicollinearity, choice of functional form, market
segmentation, expected versus actual characteristics, and altitude to risks. Omitted variable
bias causes inaccurate estimates. The choice of functional form influences the value of the
implicit prices. Multicollinearity presents the disadvantage of entangled implicit prices,
Hanley et al. (2007). Consequently, the appropriate hedonic models must consider these
empirical caveats and control for these econometric challenges.
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V.

Data

Based on the hedonic model designed by this paper, the analysis requires data on home
sale transactions, house characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, the
economic times, and financial strength of homes in Fayette Kentucky. My dataset consists
of 64,727 observations which derive from the residential housing market in Fayette,
Kentucky. The dataset covers a 17-year period, 2000 to 2016 and accumulates information
from different sources, including Fayette County, Kentucky’s Lexington-Urban
government, and the US Census Bureau. I mapped and merged the data from all sources
using Quantum Geo-Information System (QGIS) techniques. The data-merging Geospatially corresponds to Kentucky Coordinate Reference System: EPSG 102679, NAD
1983 State Plane.
A. Housing Characteristics and Time Data
Housing characteristics represent the category of structural variables. As shown in Figure
2.1, a dominant portion of Fayette County. Kentucky’s residential home transactions, over
the 17-year period (2000 to 2016), occurred in the Central South-west region of the county.
This residential transaction data is accredited to and provided by the Fayette County,
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA). The PVA, an agent of the Kentucky
government, collects property data by its Ad valorem authority and taxation role. Through
these duties, the PVA stores information on all personal properties, including residential
homes. In addition to its data collection responsibilities, the PVA tracks ownership changes
and updates building characteristics. Although over 90,000 observed transactions were
provided in this study, the precise GIS merging and data cleaning processes finalize the
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observations to 64,727 transactions. For instance, I dropped all residential sales below
$16,000 real price to avoid outliers, unrealistic observations, and potential data errors.
16,000 was chosen because more than 100 hedonic studies used $16,000 as the minimum
value for housing price, Kuminoff et al. (2010). The residential data in this study capture
housing characteristics and time factors, including revealed sale transactions, house age in
linear form, square feet of the building, fixed and half bathrooms, number of floors, garage
type, and property acreage. Time data are represented by the sale's month and year. See
Table 2.1.
The revealed sale price is adjusted to 2016 real price (2016 CPI = 240.007). Over
the study period, the data reveal that homes were sold on average for $220,070. The average
home age was 34 years old. The data capture homes built in the 19th century, as early as
1810, to the final year of the study period, 2016. The average square footage of homes is
1,842 linear feet; the average story of homes is about 1.4 units tall; the average number of
fixed bathrooms is 2 units; the average number of half bathroom is a half unit, and the
average property acreage is 0.22 acres. 64% of homes have attached garage, followed by
homes with detached and no garage, respectively at about 15% and 14%. In terms of the
month factor, most of the sales occur proportionally in the months of June, July, August,
May, and August. Sales of residential properties are the lowest in the months of January,
February, and December. From the sale’s year categorical analysis, about 26% of
residential transactions occurred during the peak years of 2004 (at 9%), 2005 (at 9%), and
2003 (at 8%). Year 2010 (at 3%), 2011 (at 3%), and 2012 (at 4%) encountered the lowest
sales frequencies in the data. This paper expects that the structural variables of square
footage, story, fixed and half bathrooms, property acreage, and attached garage will
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positively increase the average home price. On the other hand, I expect that older homes
and slow sale months and years will adversely affect the house price, a negative
relationship.
B. Neighborhood Attributes Data
The neighborhood characteristics data, which are integrated to explain community forces
and socioeconomic patterns, are merged with the County map and residential data through
the QGIS package. The neighborhood data were collected from multiple sources, including
the US Census Bureau and Lexington Fayette-Urban County Government (Lexington
opened data portal). Information on the median household income at the Census Tract level
is provided by Social Explorer, a database which provides demographic data for the United
States. Note: the original source of the median household income is attributed to the US
Census Bureau and American Community Survey. Because willingness to pay for a utility
is subject to income constraint, the median household income is a proxy that represents the
household income in adjusted inflation dollars. Median household incomes are calibrated
to year-2000 adjusted price for incomes between 2000 and 2009, and to year-2010 for
incomes between 2010 and 2016. The data analysis shows that the average median
household income was $56,667 for Fayette County, Kentucky, as linked to the study
period.
14 Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) coded areas, which also serves as a proxy for
neighborhood influences on households, are included in the study. Although ZIP-code
areas are primarily used in an effective mailing system, a ZIP area might control for aspects
such as the socioeconomic pattern, population, and crime rates that are associated with
26

residential households. The proximity of a home within a 0.096-km radius of a water
network is constructed to reflect residential property's waterfront amenities. My waterfront
control does not separately describe if the water network is a branch, creek, tributary, run,
or fork. Through the established radius, the data show that 92% of the residential sales may
not have access to waterfront amenities, while 8% of homes might enjoy the benefit of
waterfront amenities. I find that waterfront properties sell above the average real price than
non-waterfront properties. The ZIP and waterfront information were freely collected
through Lexington’s open data portal. The Portal, aimed at promoting high-value
government data, is a collaborative effort between Lexington Fayette-Urban County
Government (LFUCG) and the Fayette County, Kentucky community.
Information on the accompanying elementary school districts presents lagged data
of 33 public elementary school districts in Fayette County, Kentucky over the four years.
That is, from 2011/2012 academic year to 2014/2015 academic year. The school district
data were openly collected through Fayette County Public School (FCPS). I structured the
elementary districts into three performance levels, namely Distinguished, Proficient, and
Needs Improvement. The performance levels are based on test scores percentiles. Test
scores are accumulated from the reading, mathematics, social studies, writing, and
language mechanics tests. The Distinguish level is classified on FCPS metric of 90 to 100
percentiles; the Proficient level is classified on the FCPS metric of 70 to 89 percentiles,
and the Needs-Improvement level is classified on 0 to 69 percentiles. In this study, I
construct the average performance levels by calculating the average percentiles over the
lagged academic years. Hence, the performance levels of elementary school districts are
used to explain the influence of schools on potential homeowners. Roughly, in the data,
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21% of residential sale was transacted in the Distinguished districts, and 34% and 45% of
sales occurred in the Proficient and Needs Improvement districts. Conforming to my
expectation, homes in the Distinguished districts sell above average price than homes
located in Proficient and Needs-Improvement districts. I hypothesize that high-performing
schools or elementary district with higher percentiles will positively influence residential
prices.
C. Parks and Historic Districts Data
Information on my variables of interest, park and historic district, in a similar manner, was
collected and constructed through Lexington’s open data portal and Lexington Parks and
Recreation. These sources are organs of the Lexington government. The data include 95
parks in Lexington, Fayette. The statistics in Table 2.1 show that the average distance of
residential homes to a park in the county is about 1.8 kilometers. The closest distance to a
park is 0.02 kilometers, and the farthest distance is recorded at 18 kilometers. Homes are
approximated to the nearest park using the Nearest Neighbor (NN) plugin in QGIS. To
account for park heterogenous preference, I include covariates of park type, if the park is a
lease or own park, park acreage, and if the park contains a playground. This study also
controls for if the park contains community, aquatic centers, and athletic field; if the park
is designated as a dog-friendly park and contain recreational trail if any. My data include
13 community, 10 neighborhood, 5 golf-course, 1 historic park, 3 minis, 4
national/Greenways, 4 special-use, and 2 state-owned parks.
In an effort to facilitate the empirical strategies, the data are stratified into two
groups to investigate the use-value of parks, see Table 2.2. Homes that have direct access
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to a park, i.e., share a common fence with a park, are the treatment group. Homes located
across the street, i.e., directly opposite the access-to-park-homes, make up the control
group. 678 residential transactions in the data meet the observed criteria of matched
covariates between the treatment and control groups. Homes with access to parks have an
average real price of $223,552, while homes located across the street have an average price
of $210,692. The average price of homes that are immediately around parks is $218,412.
The ages and median household income remain the only variables that are statistically
different between the groups.
Data on the historic district were freely obtained from Lexington Parks and
Recreation website. I included 17 local historic districts, scattered throughout Fayette
County, Kentucky. 683 residential transactions, accounting for approximately one percent
of sales between 2000 and 2016, are recorded in these local historic districts. A dummy is
established for whether a home is in a historic district. This action allows for residential
homes within historic districts to be compared to homes located outside local historic
districts. Up to this moment, the data analysis shows that homes in historic districts sell far
above the average price of homes outside designated districts. Following Clark & Herrin
(1997), I interact house age with the historic dummy to control for an unbiased historic
influence on the home price. To account for the spillover effect of historic districts, I
established a binary variable, capturing a two-block radius (0.16 km) around historic
neighborhoods. 446 homes were sold within the two-block radius over the study period,
2000 to 2017.
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VI.

Econometric Specifications

My empirical model, as defined by the hedonic function, applies a semi-log functional
specification to address misspecification bias, Clark & Herrin (1997), Leichenko et al.
(2000), Cropper et al. (1988), and Kuminoff et al. (2010). With the same intention of
addressing misspecification bias, I aim to control for endogeneity through the semilog
functional form. Hence, I regress the logarithm of the real price on the structural
characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, and time variables to
accurately evaluate the willingness to pay for parks and historic districts. My general
covariate approach computes
logPi = β0 + β1Ei + β2Hi + β3Ni + β4Ti + εi

(7)

where logP is the dependent variable, denoting the real price of sale for household i. The
real price is expressed in a logarithmic form to measure and interpret price elasticity. H is
the vector of structural characteristics, enveloping house age, square footage of the home,
story, fixed and half bathrooms, garage type, and property acreage. N reflects the vector of
neighborhood characteristics, including median household income, the performance level
of elementary school districts, proximity to a waterfront amenity, and ZIP-code area; E is
the vector of the environmental attributes of interest, park and historic district. T is a vector
representing the time dummies of the sale’s month and year. Recall, controls for park
include the park type, the feasibility of lease or own, park acreage, and whether the park
contains a playground, community or aquatic centers, field or court, dog park, or a
recreational trail. β depicts the parameter estimates and ε assumes that the Gauss-Markov
conditions are treated by the data and the functional form.
30

logPijk = β0 + β1ρi + β2ᴨij + β3ρ2i + β4Sk + uijk

(8)

Subscribing to this general model in Equation 7, I designed a specific model, Model 1. I
employed a covariate stepwise approach to Model 1 to evaluate the influences of parks and
historic districts on residential homes. The judicious inclusion of covariates in Model 1
accounts for the implicit prices and the robustness of the coefficients. However, a caveat
of the covariate approach is that the introduction of controls could exacerbate endogeneity
in the hedonic model. ρ depicts the distance of household i to a park, and ᴨ depicts if the
household is in a historic district j. ρ2 accounts for the quadratic relationship of distance, S
represents the spillover effect of a historic district in neighborhood k, and uijk controls for
unobservable errors. Considering the stepwise approach, first, I control for a time fixed
effects; second, I control for housing characteristics; third, I control for neighborhood fixed
effects; fourth, I account for school fixed effects, and fifth, I control for park amenities
fixed effects.
Finally, employing separate hedonic models for parks and historic districts, I built
a boundary design specification for Model 2 and 3.
logPi = β0 + β1ρi + β2xi+ ei

(9)

Model 2, as projected in Equation 9, is the boundary design specification for parks.
Equation 9 compares the geographic split between the treated areas, homes that have direct
access to parks, and the control areas, homes that are located across the street. ρ is the
treatment dummy if house i has direct entry to a park. x is the vector of covariates and e
controls for random errors.
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logPi = β0 + β1ᴨi + β2xi+ ei

(10)

Equation 10 attempts to capture the causal effects of the willingness to pay for historic
districts. Under this design, the treated areas are homes located within the 17 local historic
districts in Fayette County, Kentucky. Homes near the local historic districts, within a 0.16
km radius, are the control areas. ᴨ = the treatment dummy if a house is in a 2-block
proximity. Model 2 and 3 also incorporate a stepwise approach for the inclusion of
covariates.
A uniting force, combining park and historic districts into a single model in this
study, is the testimonial of controls. The hedonic model, which is commonly used to
investigate the values of parks and historic districts, demands the inclusion of independent
variables or attributes that are of interest. Studies on parks and historic districts usually
include similar covariates, including structural and neighborhood characteristics. In the
spirit of capturing controls that are necessary to consider for the variable of interest,
Kuminoff et al. (2010) highlighted: Neighborhood characteristics that matter to households
but are not observed by the econometrician, are often expected to be correlated with the
amenity of interest or other independent variables. Clark & Herrin (1997), focusing on
historic districts, emphasized that the success of the historic district is strongly predicted
by the characteristics of the neighborhood. Therefore, I combine parks and historic districts
in a single study to controls for covariates that are important for parks valuation, when
influenced by a historic district, and vice versa. That is, investigating historic district
influence on residential property values when a nearby park is a dependent factor.
Technically, Model 1 captures the combined effects, while Model 2 and 3 parallelly resign
to respectively focus on parks and historic districts. The combination of environmental
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variables might be necessary to research, if the context of the study encompasses and
prioritizes amenities of parks and historic districts, like urban-rural Fayette County,
Kentucky.
VII.

Result

I applied the hedonic analysis, regressing real price on the structural, neighborhood, and
environmental characteristics of homes, to estimate the willingness to pay for parks and
historic districts. Model 1, 2, and 3 results are presented in Table 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. I
checked all empirical specifications to control for the Gauss-Markov error conditions. On
average, all models used in this essay satisfied the no-multicollinearity assumptions.
Illustratively, the average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the models ranged from 1.62
to 3.89. The models’ average VIF(s) are below the thumb-rule factor of 10. In cases where
the VIF for a variable is greater than 10, I retained the highly collinear variable so as to
avoid upward biases in the estimators. For example, squared distance to the nearest park
was retained, despite being highly collinear, to explain the quadratic relationships.
Moreover, I use the Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) to
examine if my functional forms are specified and freed of omitted variable bias and to point
out issues of heteroskedasticity. In accordance with Godfrey et al. (1988), I expect that the
Ramsey test is a good instrument to determine the best functional form since the test is
swayed by normality and non-normal errors. Ramsey test, diagnosed on my models, rejects
the null hypotheses that the models have no omitted variable bias, or the models do not
suffer functional form specifications. Each model has a p-value of 0.0000 which is less
than 0.05 significance level. This result points out that the functional forms, relative to
study’s data, do not accurately specify the hedonic model. Bootstrapping the models, to
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control for misspecifications, I employ the robust statistical variance treatment to my
estimators. The robust treatment invalidates the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Yet, the
robust statistical variance treatment explains the significance of the estimators at the pvalue of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001.
A. Park Hedonic Results
Column (1) through (7), presented in Table 2.3, report findings from Model 1. Model 1
incorporates a covariate semilog specification which builds on a stepwise approach,
interpreting the estimates of parks and historic districts as elasticities. The coefficients of
nearest distance to a park are positive and statistically significant at 0.1% in (1) to (7).
Column (1) finds that as residential homes move a kilometer away from parks, the values
of homes increase by 7%. I find a similar report in Column (2), when I control for time
fixed effects of sales months and years. Evident in Column (3), the structural characteristics
of homes, such as the property acreage, fixed bathroom, and garage type, play a significant
role in influencing the estimate of the distance to the nearest park. Given the structural
attributes, the price elasticity of distance to the nearest park decreases by 57%. Resultantly,
the coefficient of the distance to a park influence on residential sale’s price is 3%, as homes
move a kilometer away. Controlling for neighborhood fixed effects in Column (4), the
coefficient decreased from 3% to 2%. School districts' impact on a house induces an effect
of 50% decrease in the nearness to park estimate, decreasing from 2% to 1%. Column (6),
controlling for park amenities fixed effects, shows a 100% increase in the coefficient from
Column (5). Here, as residential homes move a km away from a park, property value
increases by 2%. Findings from Column (1) to Column (6) indicate that homeowners are
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willing to pay a depreciated price to live close to a park, although their choices are not
linear.
The final stepwise stage in Column (7) investigates the interactions between the
nearest distance to a park and park amenities. Establishing these interactions is necessary
to test if the implicit value of living in proximity to a park is interdependent on park
amenities. We find an expected result in Column (7). Column (7) reports that as the nearest
distance to a park increases, the estimated value is -0.11. This result implies an 11%
negative influence on the values of homes, as these homes’ distances increase from a park.
With respect to park type, being statistically different from zero, as homes distances
increase from a State-owned park, the homes attract a 3% increase in housing values
relative to a community park. In addition, respectively, I find a 3%, 24%, 2%, and 13%
increase in housing values, as homes are located away from a golf course, mini, special
use, and State-owned parks. Living in proximity to a historic building and neighborhood
parks, relative to a community park, influence negative values. Respectively and giving
distance interaction, moving away from historic and neighborhood parks impact housing
price negatively by 79% and 2%. Also, parks accessible-to-lease, relative to owned-parks,
attracts a positive housing value for the average price at 14%, as homes distance away.
With respect to recreational trails, I find that as the distance of homes increases from a park
with a path and walking trails, homes’ values are negatively influenced by 3% and 1%.
With respect to other park amenities, I find that as homes distances increase from parks
with playgrounds, their average housing value decrease by 2%; and as homes distances
increase from parks with athletic fields or courts, their average housing value increase by
1%. These interaction terms indicate that historic, neighborhood, and community parks,
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and amenities like path and walking trails, and playgrounds in parks attract positive usevalues in parks. Contrariwise, the findings also suggest that golf-course, mini, special use,
State-owned parks, and amenities like parks been leased and athletic field attract external
costs or negative use-values and externalities in parks. Unlike specifications in Column (1)
to Column (6), Column (7) implies, on average and considering the interdependencies with
park features, parks are positively valued.
Model 1 is a naïve OLS regression. Model 1 might be vulnerable to empirical
pitfalls suffered by OLS estimators. Acknowledging the caveats of a naïve OLS, I applied
a park fixed effects specification to the model. Kuminoff et al. (2010) advised on the
boosting of the parsimonious models by using a spatial fixed effect specification. However,
there might be potential errors to unobservable spatial attributes which might be in the error
term and could be correlated with parks and residential home prices, Livy & Klaiber
(2010). The specifications presented in Table 2.4 include 95 parks in Fayette County,
Kentucky for the spatial effects. Controlling for the parks fixed effects and time, structural,
neighborhood, school, and amenities attributes, Column (1) in Table 2.4 shows that as
homes distance increase in kilometers from parks, residential property values increase by
1%. I find an opposite effect when distance to parks are interacted park amenities, given
park fixed effects. Therein, the findings showed an approximate 10% negative influence
on the average price of homes, as homes locate away from parks. Column (1) in Table 2.4
suggests that, on average and taking into account the mentioned controls, parks have a
negative use-value; whereas, Column (2) suggests that parks in Fayette County have
positive use-value, given the interdependencies on park amenities.
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The squared distance from a park provides evidence that is vital to explain the
quadratic relationship of parks’ influence on the price of residential homes, see Figure 2.4.
As the average distance of a home increases from a park by an equal amount, the value of
the home depreciates. This depreciation is the range of 0.02% and 0.04%. In monetary
terms, parks quadratic relationship suggests that homeowners are willing to pay an average
discount of $400 as their distance from a park increase. In dollar value, the estimate ranges
from $440 to $660, as the distance to a park increase by another kilometer.
To further investigate the mixed results from Model 1 findings in Table 2.3 and 2.4,
I employed a boundary design estimator in Model 2 to estimate park hedonic valuation.
Model 2, presented in Table 2.5, compares homes that have direct access to parks to homes
that are immediately located across-the-street from parks. In a similar stepwise approach,
I control for time fixed effects in Column (1), housing attributes in Column (2),
neighborhood fixed effects in Column (3), and school and park amenities fixed effects in
Column (4) and Column (5). Column (1) reveals a positive and statistically significant
result, at 5% significance level, for the access-to-park dummy. On average, holding all
things constant, and controlling for time fixed effects, residential properties that have direct
access to parks sell at 10% above homes located across the street. This finding suggests a
positive implicit value to have direct access to a park, which is valued at $37,210. The
report from Column (1) fails to reject my hypothesis that parks have a positive influence
on the price of residential homes. This result indicates that homes utilize parks’ amenities.
Controlling for housing and neighborhood characteristics, school performance levels and
park amenities fixed effects, Column (2) to Column (5) in Model 2 show no significant
results. These findings in Column (2) to Column (5) imply that homes with direct access
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to parks are not statistically different from home across the street from parks. The time
fixed effects of sale month and year are the only factors that are likely to influence homes
values in a close proximity to parks. In this case, structural characteristics, neighborhood,
school districts, and park amenities do not influence the park valuation. Nevertheless, in
terms of park amenities, I find that recreational trails are significant for the positive
valuation of close proximity to parks, while athletic field negatively affects parks’ values.
The findings in Model 1 provide mixed results to support my general hypothesis.
Basically, I expected that parks have a positive impact on the residential homeowners. In
part, the negative findings I report add to the argument which supports the mixed valuation
of parks, McConnell and Walls (2005) and Livy and Klaiber (2013). Livy and Klaiber
(2013) argued that disaggregating parks into amenities could provide an accurate estimate
for parks. Livy and Klaiber suggest that the negative findings in the aggregate park value
and park amenities are influenced by noise pollution, renovations that increase potential
negative externalities (e.g., light renovation), and increased daytime activities.
B. Historic District Regressions Results
Results from the hedonic estimates in Model 1, presented in Table 2.3, also present findings
of the local historic districts. The effect of historic districts on home sale price is
statistically different at 0.01% through Column (1) to Column (7) in Table 2.3. Column (1)
presents that homes in designated areas sell at 30% above all homes in Fayette County,
Kentucky. In monetary terms, the marginal willingness to pay for a historic district is
$66,020. Controlling for time fixed effects of sale month and year in Column (2),
residential properties’ values increase by 3% from (1); the value of residential homes in
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local historic districts becomes 31% higher than the value of homes outside locally
designated areas. Through Column (3) to Column (5), I find the highest willingness to pay
for historic districts when controlling respectively for homes structural, neighborhood, and
school attributes. These reports show a 51% increase in the average price for homes in local
historic districts, valued at $112,541. Column (3) to Column (5) demonstrate that
structural, neighborhood, and the school factors, along with the impacts of designated
areas, have strong influences on property values. Furthermore, when I control for park
amenities’ fixed effects on property values in (6), historic district estimate decreases by
25%. This change, by the inclusion of the nearest park features, sets the value of local
historic district influence on residential homes to 38%. Herein, this impact, given park
amenities controls, is valued at $83,625. Lastly, in Column (7) of Table 2.3, the hedonic
value of historic districts influence on homes is 39% greater than homes outside locally
designated areas.
I also check in Model 1 for the effect of historic districts on the surrounding
neighborhood. Findings in Column (1) and Column (2) do not show a statistically
significant result. The findings in Column (3) through Column (7) indicate that homes
within a 2-block radius of local historic districts sell higher than homes outside local
designated in Fayette County, Kentucky. The values of these sales are respectively at 19%,
22%, 20%, 13%, and 15%. These results might suggest a spillover effect from historic
districts on the immediate residential neighborhoods. I do not identify this scenario as
gentrification. Clark and Herrin (1997) employed an analogous approach to measure
historic district spillover effects. Clark and Herrin tested for historic district spillover
effects on properties across the street and within a block of the historic boundary.
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Model 3, reported in Table 2.6, compared homes in historic districts to similar
homes in the 2-block neighborhood radius outside the historic districts. In a stepwise
approach, I control for time fixed effects in Column (1), housing characteristics in Column
(2), neighborhood fixed effect in Column (3), and school district fixed effects in Column
(4). All results show that historic districts have a positive effect on housing price, indicating
a positive impact of housing value greater than the surrounding neighborhoods. The
historic district estimate is interpreted as 31%, valued at $77,767. The historic district
estimates, when controlling individually for housing characteristics in Column (2) and
neighborhood fixed effects in Column (3), is changed to 0.26 from 0.31 in Column (1). In
Column (2) and Column (3), the influence of historic district on housing price is the same:
Local historic district increases residential home prices by 26% (valued at $65,224). The
introduction of school fixed effects in Column (4) increase the estimates of historic districts
reported in Column (2) and Column (3). In Column (4), I find that local historic district
influence properties’ values by a 31% increase in the average sale price over surrounding
residential properties.
Evident in Model 1 and Model 3, I fail to reject the hypothesis that historic districts
have a positive influence on residential properties. Overall, the findings in Model 1 and
Model 3 imply that historic district provides environmental benefits, as well as public and
private incentives. My study supports the argument that historic districts have a net positive
impact on property values, substantiating the findings of Clark and Herrin (1997),
Leichenko et al. (2000), and Coulson & Lahr (2005). These results covering local historic
districts from the context of Fayette County, Kentucky also apply to local historic districts
in the United States. Housing and neighborhood characteristics, as well as school district
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effects, might shape the dynamics of historic districts across cities. Fayette County,
Kentucky is an urban-rural environment. It would be subtle to use a large dataset from
rural, urban-rural, and urban cities to estimate historic districts (i.e., local, State, and
Nationally) influence on residential properties.
VIII.

Discussion and Implications

Results from the hedonic analysis, with application to environmental studies, provide
implications for the use-value of environmental goods. Recall, environmental goods may
not have a structured market to price their use-values. However, the environment can be
valued implicitly through the housing market.
A. Parks: Mitigating Negative Externalities
The use-value of parks remain a sensitive issue to private homeowners and the public who
utilize parks. Assessing the performance and utilization of parks is also a sensitive issue
with key authorities who maintain, fund, conserve, and study this type of green, Klaiber
and Phaneuf (2010). Due to the mixed evidence of the negative and positive implicit values
of parks in this study, including Walls (2005) and Livy and Klaiber (2013), I recommend
that mitigation strategies should be designed to address the negative externalities linked to
parks.
One of the mechanisms that can be used to obtain parks, embedded with positive
externalities and rid of negative use values, is to conduct a use-value surveys or reviews
research. Given Fayette County, Kentucky’s residential market, the implicit result of park
values may only apply to residential homeowners near a park. These results might be
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limited in reflecting the overall public valuation of parks and attached features. Using
surveys or reviews can help parks’ authorities and key role players to redirect funding,
develop projects, and maintain specific park types and amenities. The survey also allows
for detecting and strategizing the mitigation of negative externalities in parks. By way of
illustration, Lexington, Kentucky government’s office of Park and Recreation is
accumulating responses by means of face to face conversations, surveys, and public
meetings to make a master plan for parks and recreation in Fayette County, Park and
Recreation (2017). One of the intentions of these public engagements is finding out what
people want in parks. Hitherto, Fayette County, Kentucky park authority has surveyed 952
households, categorizing their feedback into places, programs, and actions. Interestingly,
the park authority integrates, into their survey, questions about household barriers to park.
However, within the pillar of what people want, the authority could incorporate a fourth
category, called negative park features and activities. Subsequently, by this action,
mitigation strategies can be designed to address negative externalities associated parks.
The negative externalities encountered by private homeowners might be attributed
to noise pollution, renovations that increase potential negative externalities and increased
daytime activities. Private residents and park authorities can alleviate the indirect and
unintentional negative effects of parks through the following strategies: Rallying to express
views on issues that affect homeowners directly; calling the local authorities; lobbying for
local ordinance to reinforce regulations to curb nuisance violations in and around parks;
engineering infrastructures to lessen light or noise pollution, and redesigning parking
strategies around parks vehicles. For example, homeowners could exercise free speech on
parklands, in conformity with the first amendment right of free speech.
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B. Historic District: Investment Analysis
Findings, at least robust in the coefficient signs in Model 1 and 3, for local historic districts
show that historic districts have a positive influence on housing value. This implies that
benefits such as tax credits and positive neighborhood upkeep surpass the maintenance cost
and hurdles associated with historic districts. These implications support the argument of
shared economic security and incentives in historic districts. Tax incentive programs for
historic districts is a strong positive force. The tax incentive program supports
rehabilitation in historic districts by providing a 20% tax credit for the certified
rehabilitation of certified historic structures, Historic Preservation Tax Incentives (2012).
This benefit is instrumental in facilitating economic development in historic neighbors.
Leichenko et al. (2000) the cause of preservation tax incentives since higher property
values in historic districts also means paying higher property tax. Homeowners or sellers
can also enjoy direct public benefits in historic districts. For example, the Technical
Preservation Service of the National Park Service provides technical resources to assist and
guide the maintenance of historic buildings. Locally, historic authorities also provide
technical assistance to owners of historic properties.
My discussion does not emphasize the cost associated with historic districts.
Nevertheless, I communicate important risks associated with historic districts. Even though
the study results imply that the tax credit program for historic homes is effective, a
homeowner might face the risk of unharmonized certification process and construction
permits huddles. Secondly, risks might include neglected homes in the neighborhood, thus
creating an ugly character of the historic district. Thirdly, less rigid regulations in historic
districts could fuel disinvestments, delayed maintenance, and contribute to inappropriate
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materials being used. Moreover, homeowners or sellers may have a conflict of interest in
using modern materials or technologies versus sticking to certified materials for historic
districts. A final risk could be renovation misconceptions among neighbors in a historic
district.
Most studies, arguing against historic district settlements, have repeatedly claimed
that historic districts promote gentrification pressures. For instance, Conde (2007)
criticized and opposed the program of historic districts. Conde portrays historic districts as
neighborhoods that discourage interracial integration and promote segregation, especially
in favor of white families. Groups like the Virginia Land Right Coalition reasoned that
poor people will be squeezed out of their communities because property values will
increase, and tax benefits are illegal. A priori, there seems to be little or no disclaimer from
historic district authorities on these claims. Illustratively, Lexington Preservation, via its
website, communicates licensing, permit development systems, and review processes.
Lexington Preservation neither has an established disclaimer to distance historic districts
from the stained characterization of gentrification nor recognizable actions which
demonstrate that historic authorities support equity for all potential homeowners, social
integration, and lawful justifications. I recommend that the National Registry of Historic
Places and local historic district authorities should openly revoke connections to
gentrification.
IX.

Conclusion

Studies, local inhabitants, and public authorities usually support the conversation of green
space. Parks and historic districts are green space amenities intended to endorse benefits
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like recreational, public events, environmental sustainability, and private investments.
Despite the positive utilities associated with parks and historic districts, these green spaces
do face challenges. Investigating the implicit values of parks and historic districts, I employ
a hedonic model. The log of the real sale price is regressed on the structural, neighborhood,
and environmental attributes of homes to analyze parks and historic districts influences on
the residential market. My empirical specifications are presented in three models. In these
models, I use a stepwise approach for the inclusion of controls and a robust treatment for
measurement errors.
Finding from the covariate approach reports a negative implicit value for parks.
This result indicates that parks, hosting features, do have externalities which negatively
affect the use-value of parks. Through the hedonic approach, it is evident that factors of
sale month and year, and housing, neighborhood and environmental attributes do affect the
magnitude of park valuation. When I interact distance to the nearest park with the park
amenities, I find that parks have positive use-values. This result suggests that a park
valuation is interdependent on its amenities. Following the covariate approach, I also
measured the value for parks by comparing properties that have direct access to parks to
properties that are located across the street. In this case, I also find a positive willingness
to pay for parks, signaling positive use-values. Given the covariate and boundary design
models, parks and the amenities hosted by parks have mixed valuation. Parks positive usevalues are tied to the type of park and features like multi-purpose trails. Negative usevalues might be caused by factors of noise, light pollution, and undesirable park usage,
Livy and Klaiber (2010). Finally, I find that as homes double their distance from parks, the
value of park increases. Findings from all models show that historic districts have a positive
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value on residential properties above homes located outside the designated areas. The result
is correspondingly true when I compare historic districts to other areas in Fayette County,
Kentucky. These findings imply strong positive environmental benefits and economic
securities associated with historic districts. I also find a positive impact on homes in the
two-block radius neighborhoods surrounding designated areas. I implicate this finding to a
spillover effect of the historic districts on the surrounding neighborhoods.
I discussed mitigation strategies to address the negative effects and externalities of
parks. I recommend that parks’ authorities intentionally use surveys to detect and to
mitigate negative parks externalities and improve undesirable facilities; private owners in
proximity to parks should voice, report, and channel grievances from park nuisance to local
authorities. In terms of designated districts, I discussed the positive benefits of investing,
either as a homeowner or seller, in the historic district residential market. I also highlight
risks that might impede benefits and investments in historic areas. Chiefly, I recommend
to National, State, and local historic authorities to adopt communications and interventions
that could directly address gentrification and actions that could prove that historic district
stands for societal, environmental, and economic integration.
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X.

Tables

Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of the Continuous Variables of Structural
Attributes and Distance to Parks
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Price (real dollars)
64,727 $220,070 $150,730 $16,202 $5,591,398
House Age (years)
64,727
34
25
0
206
Square Footage (linear feet) 64,727
1,842
749
416
10,762
Story (unit)
64,727
1.4
0.4
1
3
Fixed Bathroom (unit)
64,727
2
1
1
10
Half Bathroom (unit)
64,727
0.5
0.5
0
4
Property acreage (acres)
64,727
0.22
0.18
0.002
9.75
Nearest Park Distance (km)
64,727
1.8
1.44
0.02
18
Median Income (dollars)
64,727 $56,667
$20,253 $12,288 $16,8103
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Table 2.2. Comparing Residential Homes that have Access-to-Park to Homes
located Across-the-Street

Variable

Real Price (dollars)
Age (years)
Square Size (square feet)
Story (unit-feet)
Fixed Bathroom (unit)
Half Bathroom (Unit)
Property acreage (acres)
Median Income (dollars)

Access to Park
(Treatment Group)
407 Homes
Mean

Across from Park
(Control Group)
271 Homes
Mean

T-Statistics
(Pr(|T| > |t|)
p-value

$223,552
25
2,008
1.5
2
0.3
0.19
$60,324

$210,692
29
1,924
1.5
2
0.3
0.19
$55,424

0.1857
0.0079*
0.1431
0.0769
0.2580
0.8587
0.311
0.0003*
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Table 2.3. Hedonic Estimates of Park: Findings of Distance to Nearest Park
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. Dev: $150,730)
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.07***

0.07***

0.03***

0.02***

0.01***

0.02***

-0.11***

(30.97)

(30.99)

(16.99)

(6.84)

(5.92)

(9.32)

(-7.33)

Distance
squared
(km)

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.003***

-0.004***

(-8.77)

(-8.42)

(-10.34)

(-4.81)

(-4.68)

(-9.86)

(-6.53)

Historic
district

0.30***

0.31***

0.51***

0.51***

0.51***

0.38***

0.39***

(16.91)

(17.41)

(28.89)

(24.12)

(24.28)

(28.92)

(17.07)

-0.07

-0.06

0.19***

0.22***

0.20***

0.13***

0.15***

Nearest park

Hist. (spill
effect)

(-1.67)

(-1.64)

(6.81)

(9.74)

(9.27)

(9.14)

(6.69)

Time FEs

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

House
controls
Neighborho
od controls
School FEs

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Park
amenities
Fes
Distance to
golf-course
park

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

0.03**

(3.11)
Distance to
historic
bldg. park.

-0.79***

(-8.73)
Distance to
mini park

0.24***

Distance to
neighborhoo
d park

-0.02***

(13.05)

(-6.61)
Distance to
national
park

0.07

(0.01)
Distance to
special use
park

0.02**

Distance to
State-owned
park

0.13***

(2.73)
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Table 2.3. (Continued)
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. Dev: $150,730)
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
(9.21)

Distance to
a leased
park

0.14***

(10.12)
Distance to
park with
path trail

-0.03***

(-11.63)
Distance to
park with
shared trail

0.01

Distance to
park with
walking trail

-0.01***

(-0.79)

(-4.30)
Distance to
a park with
playground

-0.02***

(-7.13)
Distance to
park with
comm center

-0.02***

(-1.14)
Distance to
park with
pool

0.01

(0.08)
Distance to
park with
athl. Field

0.01***

(4.64)
Obs
R2

64,727

64,727

64,727

64,727

64,727

64,727

64,727

0.02

0.04

0.69

0.75

0.75

0.76

0.76

Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to
Column (7) represents a semi-log specification.
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Table 2.4. Hedonic Estimates of Park: The Inclusion of Park Fixed Effects to
Nearest Distance
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std.
Dev: $150,730)
Variable
(1)
(2)
Nearest park (km)
0.01***
-0.06**
(4.16)
(4.17)
Distance squared (km)
-0.002***
-0.003***
(-4.81)
(-4.97)
Historic district controls
Yes
Yes
Park FEs (n = 95 parks)
Yes
Yes
Time FEs (nyear=17;
Yes
Yes
nmonth=12)
House controls
Yes
Yes
Neighborhood controls
Yes
Yes
School FEs (n=3 levels)
Yes
Yes
Distance to golf-course
0.07***
park
(5.38)
Distance to historic bldg.
-0.50***
park.
(-5.12)
Distance to mini park
0.20***
(10.38)
Distance to neighborhood
0.002
park
(-0.72)
Distance to national park
-0.1
(-1.06)
Distance to special use
0.30***
park
(16.63)
Distance to State-owned
0.08***
park
(5.53)
Distance to a leased park
0.8***
(5.53)
-0.03***

Distance to park with path
trail

(-10.09)
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Table 2.4. (Continued)
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std.
Dev: $150,730)
Variable
(1)
(2)
Distance to park with
0.04***
shared trail
(5.79)
Distance to park with
0.001
walking trail
(0.52)
Distance to a park with
0.01***
playground
(3.40)
Distance to park with
0.04**
comm center
(2.98)
Distance to park with pool
-0.03
center
(-4.52)
Distance to park with athl.
-0.01**
Field
(-2.59)
Observations

64,727

64,727

R2
0.78
0.78
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to
Column (2) represents a semi-log specification.
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Table 2.5. Hedonic Estimates of Direct Access-to-Park: Boundary Design Regression
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $372,108, Std. Dev:
$138,408)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Access to Park (dummy, default
0.10*
0.03
0.003
0.0001
-0.003
= Across-the-street properties)
(2.18)
(1.70)
(0.19)
(0.04)
(-0.16)
Time FEs (nyear=17; nmonth=12)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
House controls
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Neighborhood FEs
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Park amenities FEs
No
No
No
No
Yes
Observation
678
678
678
678
678
2
R
0.04
0.78
0.85
0.86
0.87
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to
Column (5) represents a semi-log specification.
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Table 2.6. Hedonic Estimates of Historic District using Boundary Design
Regression
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $250,861, Std. Dev:
$141,244)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Historic District (default = 2 block
0.31****
0.26***
0.26*** 0.31***
neighborhood)
(7.07)
(8.20)
(8.82)
(8.17)
Time FEs (nyear=17; nmonth=12)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
House controls
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Neighborhood FEs
No
No
Yes
Yes
School Fes
No
No
No
Yes
Observation
1,095
1,095
1,095
1,095
R2
0.12
0.61
0.66
0.70
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to
Column (4) represents a semi-log specification.
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XI.

Figures

Figure 2.1. Fayette County, Kentucky Residential Transactions, 2000 to 2017

Figure 2.1: The map depicts the cluster of homes sold in the study period, between 2000
and 2016, embedded in Fayette County, Kentucky Census Block Groups.
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Figure 2.2. Fayette County, Kentucky Neighborhood Map, 2000 to 2017

Figure 2.2: The map shows the clusters of homes in Fayette County, Kentucky over the
study period linked to the neighborhood attributes of ZIP areas, elementary school districts,
and waterfront amenities.
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Figure 2.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Parks and Historical District Map, 2000 to
2017

Figure 2.3: An illustration of residential home sales in Fayette County, Kentucky around
my variables of interest, parks and historic districts, over study dimension, 2000 and 2016.
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Figure 2.4. Quadratic Plot of Park Distance in Kilometer

Figure 2.4: A quadratic plot demonstrating the relationship of the implicit value for
residential homes, as the homes average distance increase from the nearest park. Distance
is measured in kilometer (km) and shown on the horizontal axis.
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CHAPTER THREE: WILLINGNESS TO AVOID LEAD RISK IN WATER
QUALITY: ARE THERE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES?
Most Americans have access to water, yet America faces water challenges including lead
contamination. My research asked questions about potential lead risk and lead-risk
information asymmetries among homeowners. Using data from the Property Valuation
Administrator in Fayette County, Kentucky, I answer the research questions through the
application of hedonic analysis. I find an implicit positive value to avoid lead risk. I also
report that buyers in high-lead risk neighborhoods might be less informed. I recommend to
States and local authorities to periodically communicate lead risk to the public.
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I.

Introduction

The United States access to water is rated at 99.26%, yet America is constrained with water
quality assurance, pointing to risks of lead in the water supply systems. Accordingly, a
quality water supply should be freed from meaningful physical, chemical, biological, or
harmful radiological substances, including lead contamination. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations set lead concentration to be less than 15 parts per
billion (ppb) in a sampled 10% of a water zone. EPA revealed that nine States are reporting
safe lead levels in their water supplies. However, about 5,300 States' water systems might
be in violation of the lead rules, and there is a lack of residents’ trust when it comes to
reporting, testing, and treatment for lead contamination in water supplies, CNN (2016).
Residents could possess elementary knowledge about lead contamination, but they might
not be certain in determining the level of lead in their drinking water. The specific problem
lies in the identification of lead contamination in a community water supply. The risk of
lead in a water system can be certainly identified or can be challenging to detect. In a
certain case of lead-risk identification, some counties in America report with confidence
that their geographical subdivisions have no known lead risk and other counties confirm
lead contents in their water supply. On the gray front, some counties cannot point out if
their homes, water meters, water treatment and distribution systems contain lead materials.
Given this background, I ask the following questions: How does lead exposure risk
in a water supply system affect housing values? Is there a presence of information
asymmetries among homeowners relative to lead in their water supplies? I hypothesized
that residential homeowners will pay more for lead-free water. I expect that homeowners
in the high lead-risk water areas might have little information on their water supply
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compared to low-lead exposure neighborhoods. I assume asymmetric information in highrisk areas because water lead-risk is not required to be reported during home sale
transactions. Besides, real estate experts observe that a water problem is frequently
concealed above all other home disclosures, Gassett (2016). In this study, I hope to measure
the influence of lead-risk level on residential home sale transactions and to communicate
policy implications for homeowners, home sellers, and policymakers to address the
concern of lead-risk in the water systems.
This paper’s contribution to the water quality literature lies in assessing the hedonic
valuation of a probable lead risk in drinking water and searching for the possibility of
asymmetric information. The literature on water hedonic pricing ranges from valuing
surface water to pricing water through the land market. Other studies, not using hedonic
analysis, have also evaluated the willingness to pay for municipal water supply and
drinking water quality. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) used hedonic analysis to demonstrate
the effect of water quality on waterfront properties in the Chesapeake Bay area. Using eight
empirical specifications, Leggett and Bockstael reports show that as bacteria level increase
in the Bay, property values reduce by 5%. Buck et al. (2014) also contribute to this paper
through their supportive argument that a stable market can be used to infer the value of an
environmental good. Piper (2003) evaluates the impact of water quality on municipal water
price and residential water demand. Piper’s results support the argument that households
appreciate an improved water quality system. Powell & Allee’s (1990) results, from a
contingent valuation survey carried out in four towns in Massachusetts, show that people
are willing to pay more for drinking water quality, especially when they have experienced
contamination harms. Jordan & Elnagheeb (1993) find that 23% of households were
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uncertain of their drinking water quality. Trending studies are addressing the general course
of lead in the national water supply. Theising (2017) is discussing “Lead pipes, prescriptive
policy and property values, lead pipes and prescriptive policy”; Irwin (2017) on
“Homebuyer risk perception in the face of potential lead exposure”, and Grooms et al.
(2017) on “Drinking water and lead: Evidence from local treatment changes in North
Carolina”.
The theoretical framework of this essay is underpinned by the hedonic theory.
Rosen (1974) presents that goods are valued for their utility bearing attributes. A class of
differentiated products has a vector of measurable characteristics which define a set of
hedonic prices. I assume the housing market is a differentiated product market, which has
a bundle of characteristics. Residential homes host characteristics like square feet,
structural design of the home, being close to an environmental amenity or being linked to
a certain water quality zone. Overall, the theory calls for information on the structural
characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, and other controls to capture
implicit price effects. I depart from Rosen on the assumptions of no second-hand market
and the perception of identical characteristics. Akerlof’s (1970) theory debated on quality
in the market. He pointed out good and bad qualities in market mechanisms and argued
that rational consumers will demand better quality. To carry out the hedonic analysis, my
dataset merges information from Fayette County, Kentucky Property Valuation
Administrator, Vox Media, and other sources like Census Bureau. The study period
covered a 17-year period (2000 to 2016) and included 70,619 sales transactions that
occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky. To evaluate the willingness to pay for lead risk in
the water quality supply, I applied empirical specifications of ordinary least squares, two-
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stage least squares, and propensity score matching. To check for asymmetric information,
I constructed a deterministic model, advised by Kurlat and Stroebel (2015), to test for
differences between appreciating rates in the low and high lead water risk zones.
In this paper, Section 2 presents the problem of lead contamination in water
supplies and the specific problem of identifying lead risk in water communities. Section 3
provides a review of the hedonic literature, water quality papers, and hints on trending
studies in the case of lead in the United States. Section 4 describes the theories that support
the study and the data is described in Section 5. I examine the research questions in Section
6 through the empirical specifications, including a deterministic test. Section 7 shows the
findings from lead-risk influence on the residential market and reports the test of the
deterministic model on asymmetric information. Finally, Section 8 gives a summary,
provides implications, and suggests a way to improve the study’s gaps.
II.

Background

Global water supply is very important to every region of the world, as water supply issues
sprout from health to environmental concerns. For example, despite North America,
including Canada, accessibility level of water is above the global average of 90.7%, the
United States face challenges of water allocation and quality. The alarming risk of lead
level in drinking water is one of the water quality challenges. According to the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), a quality water supply is free from meaningful physical,
chemical, biological, or harmful radiological substances. Relative to the risk of lead
contamination, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates that
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the lead concentration in public water systems must not exceed an action level of 15 parts
per billion (ppb) in more than 10% of customers' tap samples.
In March 2016, CNBC News article published: America's water crisis goes beyond
Flint, Michigan… impacting millions of lives and costing billions of dollars in damages.
The new wave of lead awareness reverberates the need for financing and investing in the
Nation’s water infrastructures to protect citizens from serious public health dangers. EPA
disclosed that only nine States are reporting safe levels of lead in their water supplies.
These States include Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Tennessee. 5,300 States' water systems, supplying about
eighteen million Americans, are believed to be in violation of lead rules. From a residential
viewpoint, homeowners have expressed a lack of trustworthiness in the reporting, testing,
and treatment for lead contamination in water supplies CNN (2016).
Residents may have basic knowledge about how one can be exposed to lead
contamination, but homeowners might not know the levels of lead in their drinking water.
Sometimes, through macro-observation, residents can easily point out that their water
supply is contaminated. For instance, when the city of Flint, Michigan switched to the Flint
River for supply, residents noticed and complained about the discolored water. Besides,
respectively, pediatricians and independent studies noticed the high level of lead in children
and the local water supply, Jordan (2016). Locating lead pipes, which cause contaminations
in communities’ water supplies, can be a challenge. The central problem lies in identifying
water services or supplies that are contaminated by lead. Identifying whether water supplies
are contaminated by lead can be a certain case or a gray area between certainty and
uncertainty. In the case of certainty, some counties in the Nation report with confidence
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that their geographical subdivisions have no known lead contents in their water services,
while others confirm lead contents in their water services. Illustrating the former on the
certainty of no lead contamination, a few counties in Southwest Ohio, namely Butler,
Englewood, Fairborn, Fairfield, and Green counties, report no lead contamination in their
water services. These counties are certain, claiming meters were replaced; their
communities contain only iron, copper, and plastic pipes; new developments and buildings
were constructed after 1998, and their water treatment and distribution systems were
created after 1957. Regarding the latter certain case on confirmed lead risk, some counties
in the region have validated the presence of lead risks in their areas. Herein, counties such
as Miamisburg, New Carlisle, Oakwood, Oxford, and Sidney counties in Southwest Ohio
confirmed lead services on the basis that their water supply connections and service lines
in public and private properties contain lead in their water distribution systems. That is,
there are proven lead lines, solders, fixtures, or goosenecks; and most homes were built
between 1900 and 1950, and as far back as 1895. Counties like Piqua and Franklin in
Southwest Ohio report their water systems as probable lead areas because of old
developments, while lead pipes are being replaced, Driscoll (2017).
This study asks these research questions: What is the hedonic valuation of lead
exposure risk in the water supply? Are there information asymmetries among homeowners
relative to lead-risk in their water supplies? I expect that residential homeowners will pay
more price for good water quality. I also expect, on average, homeowners in high-lead
water exposure areas may have little information on their water supply compared to low
lead exposure neighborhoods. The latter hypothesis assumes that asymmetric information
is present, mostly for high-risk than low-risk areas, see Figure 3.1.

65

It is important to consider the effect of a probable lead risk on housing valuation
due to the health concerns, environmental engagements, and decisions that are needed to
finance the replacement of lead service lines and lead components in United States’ watercommunities. Lead contamination in the water supply is an aged infrastructure problem
which is caused by older pipes that contain lead. Lead may enter water systems as it
dissolves through lead-pipes when water passes through the distribution channels. One of
the main sources of lead contamination is lead service lines that connect water mains to
residential properties. Also, pipes within homes, soldered with lead, might contribute to
lead contamination, as water sits idle in these pipes while the system is not in use in the
home, Kentucky Division of Water (2017). In 1986, amendments to the drinking water act
prohibited the use of the not-lead-free pipe, plumbing fitting, fixture, solder, or flux in
public, residential, and nonresidential buildings. Not until 1996, it became unlawful for
any person to introduce into the market any pipe, plumbing fitting or fixture which is not
lead-free, EPA (2017) and Cornell Law School (2017). Lead toxicity gives rise to serious
health defects in the human body. Most especially, lead harm is severe to little children.
10% to 20% of a lead intake in children is caused when water, which is poisoned by lead,
is consumed, Rabin (2008). Lead intake and accumulation promote weakened cognitive
development in children, damage kidney function, produce cardiovascular problems, and
negatively affect the brain, liver, and bones. In extreme cases, lead intake might result in
death. In short, the presence of lead in a water supply can engender health risks to the
public.
Financing the replacement of lead in public and private properties is a major
mitigating, or better say, eradicating strategy in the United States. There have been
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alternative financing approaches, designed or being proposed. Since 1996, the Drinking
Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF), a federal-state partnership, has promoted the
financing of safe water systems in each State. Following the Flint, Michigan crisis in 2014,
the White House pledged more than five-billion dollars to improve water quality in the
nation. Today, Federal agencies such as CDC and EPA, tasked with tackling lead
contamination, have experienced a fiscal year (FY) budget cut. For example, CDC
encountered a 17% budget reduction in FY 2017/2018, counting a cut in areas of
prevention, environmental health, and toxic substances, CDC (2017). In addition to
financing mechanisms, a legislative bill is debating the provision of loans or grants to
finance the removal of lead pipes. This Lead Act, LRB-1934, calls for authorities to be
given to local governments for the provision of an opportunity and for a local water utility
to provide financial assistance for replacing the lead service lines, Cowles (2017).
III.

Literature Review

This paper contributes to the water quality literature by assessing the hedonic valuation of
a probable lead exposure risk in drinking water and to search for the possibility of
asymmetric information relative to lead risk in the residential market. The literature on
water hedonic pricing ranges from the surface water valuation of waterfront properties to
pricing water through the land market. Other studies, not using hedonic analysis have also
evaluated the willingness to pay for municipal water supply and drinking water quality.
Together, these studies have considered and investigated the value of surface and
groundwater quality amid water challenges. For instance, valuation papers have covered
damages caused by sediments, bacteria, nutrients, and soil erosion-related pollutants in
water networks such as streams, lakes, reservoirs, and estuaries. At the time of this
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research, there are a series of forthcoming papers that are addressing the general course of
lead in the national water supply.
A. Hedonic Valuation of Water Quality
The attempt to understand the implicit valuation of environmental goods in a nonmarket
scenario is a path I aim to build my analysis on. There may not be an explicit market to
price whether homeowners place an appreciation or depreciation on their water quality.
However, given this nonmarket scenario, the hedonic analysis is a tool that can tease out
the willingness to pay for lead exposure risk. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) used hedonic
analysis to demonstrate the effect of water quality on waterfront properties in the
Chesapeake Bay area. Leggett and Bockstael influence the approach and analysis of this
paper through their argued hypothesis that good water quality positively affects the values
of residential properties. Accordingly, homeowners are expected to bid for prices of
residential units which have a desirable level of characteristics, including water quality. It
is expected that locals will be willing to pay an appreciated price for low exposure risk
neighborhoods. The low-lead risk is certainly a higher environmental quality. The authors
point out to a robust empirical work as a convincing factor in considering the significance
of the environmental result. In this case, a robust empirical work means cleaning the
analysis of ambiguities, such as functional form, and addressing market segmentation and
multicollinearity. So, Leggett and Bockstael (2000) measured water quality, referencing
waterfront amenity to properties, on the level of fecal coliform bacteria existing in the
water. In their study, it was assumed that information on coliform bacteria is spatially and
explicitly available to the public. That is, residential homeowners in the context of the study
had symmetric information on the level of fecal in their surface water. This assumption is
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vital to this paper because it sets the stage to picture the argument of information
asymmetries. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) constructed eight empirical specifications to
estimate the hedonic price using an ordinary least square (OLS) estimator. Within the scope
of their study, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Leggett and Bockstael find that an
increasing level of bacteria in the Bay significantly reduces property values by 5%.
Buck et al. (2014) research also influence this paper, through their supportive
argument, by using a stable market to infer the value of an environmental good; a reminder
that the hedonic procedure is common to influencing environmental policies. Buck et al.
use evidence from the land market to infer the value of irrigation water, an environmental
nonmarket good. Unlike using the OLS cross-sectional data estimator, the authors support
the application of a hedonic model that uses a fixed effect estimator. Besides, Buck et al.
(2014) highlight the use of an instrumental variable model, as used by Kuminoff & Pope
(2012) and Bishop & Timmins (2013), as an alternate approach which could consistently
and comparably estimate the willingness to pay for an environmental good. This advice is
adhered to, in my econometric section, as one of the robust estimators. Despite the
uniqueness of the hedonic literature, other empirical models can be used to estimate the
implicit value of water quality. For example, Bockstael et al. (1987) applied models of
systems of demands, discrete choice, and hedonic travel cost to validate the willingness to
pay for water quality.
B. Non-Hedonic Valuation of Residential Water Supply
It is almost inevitable to argue against the premise that high-quality water supply is valued
above low-quality water supply. This argument is also necessary to set the expectation
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when measuring the impact of lead exposure risk in water quality on the residential market.
An array of non-hedonic studies have evidently proven the vertical structure of water
valuation. Piper (2003) evaluates the impacts and implications of water quality on
municipal water price and residential water demand. Piper work assessed the extent to
which a water quality influences residential water supply expense system and impacts the
households’ prices. Piper (2003) supports the arguments that households have a higher
willingness to pay for improved domestic water quality. In the water-use model, Piper
conclusion holds that poor water quality leads to higher treatment cost and higher water
rates. Jordan & Elnagheeb (1993), Powell & Allee (1990), and Schultz & Lindsay’s (1990)
hypotheses also agree on the willingness to pay for an improved water quality. Jordan &
Elnagheeb (1993) surveyed people’s willingness to pay for improved drinking water
quality and the perception of water impurity in their areas. Jordan & Elnagheeb, using the
contingent valuation method in Georgia, find that 23% of households were uncertain of
their drinking water quality. This finding is essential to communicate the presence of
asymmetric information among residents in a water community. Powell & Allee’s (1990)
results, from a contingent valuation survey carried out in four towns in Massachusetts,
show that people are willing to pay more for drinking water quality, especially when they
have experienced contamination harms. Finally, demonstrating homeowners’ willingness
to pay for water quality, Schultz & Lindsay’s (1990) results showed that both residents and
the community were willing to pay a higher price for a hypothetical groundwater plan.
Forthcoming studies are equally addressing the environmental constraint of lead
risks. Some of the impending studies include discussions on lead pipes, prescriptive policy
and property values, Theising (2017); lead pipes and prescriptive policy: Estimating
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homebuyer risk perception in the face of potential lead exposure, Irwin (2017); and
drinking water and lead exposure: Evidence from local treatment changes in North
Carolina, Grooms et al., (2017).
IV.

Economic Model

The core of the analysis in this paper revolves around the hedonic theory. In accordance
with Rosen (1974), the hedonic hypothesis presents that goods are valued for their utility
bearing attributes. Therein, the theory draws that a class of differentiated products, which
has a vector of measurable objective characteristics, define a set of hedonic prices. The
housing market, which has a bundle of characteristics, meets the assumption of a
differentiated product market. Residential homes hold different characteristics such as
square feet, structural design of the home, being close to an environmental amenity, or
proximity to a certain water quality zone. Paramount to the theory is the argument of spatial
economic equilibrium: A consolidated set of implicit prices guides both the consumers and
producers’ locational decisions in a characteristic space. Market equilibrium, a price
clearing force which guides the decisions of both buyers and sellers, coordinate the implicit
prices from a set of characteristics. Analyzing water systems’ exposure to lead risk through
the hedonic framework, the results will yield a hedonic price for lead exposure areas. The
bundle of characteristics in the housing market includes structural, neighborhood,
environmental and time attributes.
P = f(H, N, T…, E)

(11)

Where, P, the market price is a function of the vectors of housing characteristics H,
neighborhood attributes N, time effect T, and other utilities, including a vector of
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environmental amenities, E. Although homeowners may subjectively value lead risk,
according to Rosen, it is assumed that all homeowners perceive identical characteristics.
Put in another sense, homeowners are knowledgeable about their water quality. It is also
assumed that differentiated homes may also be sold in a separate, yet highly interrelated
market.
On the producers’ front, Rosen (1974) presents that producers carefully consider
the package of characteristics to assembly in a locational decision. Residential home sellers
want to equally minimize their factor costs and produce optimal utilities. Given the latter
producer motive and arguing in favor of asymmetric information, some home sellers could
conceal information such as the probable level of lead contamination in the water supply.
Not intentionally, this action could be carried out in the spirit of minimizing cost and
presenting optimal utilities to potential residential buyers.
P(z) = CM (M, H, N, …, E)

(12)

Equation 12 manifests that P(z), the total cost of all attributes, is dependent on the function
of positive and increasing cost CM, relative to the number of homes produced by a
residential seller M and the assembled attributes, the vectors of H, N, and E. For a market
equilibrium to be satisfied, Equation 12 must be equal to a consumer bid function, as shown
in Equation 13. Equation 13 is a value function where P(z) is the amount that consumers
are willing to pay for attributes (H, N, …, E) at a fixed utility which is optimally chosen. α,
depicting optimally chosen, indicates that the utility bundles differ from household to
household and utility dependents on budget constraints, the household income y.
P(z) = U (M, H, N, …, E; α, y)
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(13)

In spite of the many inferences that can be achieved through the hedonic theory, the
theory is clouded with assumptions and faced with empirical challenges. To name a few,
empirical challenges related to the hedonic model include omitted variable bias,
multicollinearity, choice of functional form, market segmentation, and attitude to risks,
Leggett and Bockstael (2000) and Hanley et al. (2002). First, my empirical evidence of
lead exposure could be potentially bias if my model omits a variable which is important to
explain either the housing price or the lead risk variable. The variables incorporated in this
study, relative to the structural, environmental, and neighborhood attributes, might be
highly collinear. Thirdly, potential homeowners attitude to risks, such as avoiding crimes,
less energy efficient homes, and environmental disamenities, could also introduce a biased
estimate. Finally, choosing either a parsimonious or flexible functional form is affiliated
with a benefit and cost. For instance, in terms of empirical benefits, traditional
parsimonious forms like linear and logarithmic functions can have economic
interpretations and be more robust to misspecification, Cropper et al. (1988) and Kuminoff
et al. (2010).
My point of departure from Rosen (1974) is on the assumptions of no second-hand
market and symmetric information. I disapprove the former assumption of no second-hand
market in this paper because the residential market is not purely consumed. There is
overwhelming evidence of resale homes in the residential market. On the latter assumption,
Rosen assumes that although consumers may differ in their subjective valuations of
differentiated packages, all consumers’ perceptions or appraisals of a number of
characteristics embodied is identical. In respect to the focus of this essay, I question the
latter assumption and align my analysis with the theory of asymmetric information. Akerlof
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(1970) logically discussed the uncertainty of quality in market mechanisms. Practically
observing the housing market through the eye of Akerlof, there are homes with good and
bad qualities. Rationally, consumers will demand better quality.
Qd = D(P, µ)

(14)

µ = µ(P)

(15)

Qd depicts the demand for homes; P depicts price, and µ depicts water quality. In
equilibrium, Akerlof assumed that supply equals demand for given average quality.
Equation 15 depicts that the demand for water quality depends on price. Yet, Equation 14
and 15 may not hold true in the presence of asymmetric information. Relative to probable
lead risk, a buyer may perform a housing transaction without knowing whether the home
is located within a relatively low or high lead exposure zone. Even though it is possible to
value lead exposure risk through the residential market, there might be a market failure of
asymmetric information associated with the housing market. This market inefficiency
might be attributed to hidden type model, wherein residential property sellers may have
private information on the water supply that potential buyers are not knowledgeable of,
Snyder & Nicholson (2008). However, over a length of time, homeowners may acquire a
fair knowledge of the quality of their water supply. Knowing then the quality of their water,
the home’s resale may in part manifest the asymmetric information. Consequently, the null
hypothesis establishes that homes in low-risk areas may sell cheaper or at the same price
relative to homes in high-risk areas due to information asymmetries.
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V.

Data

The hedonic function calls for information on the housing characteristics, neighborhood
and environmental attributes, and other control variables in order to empirically capture the
implicit price effects on residential properties. I collected information from multiple
sources and joined the information through a Geo-information system (GIS) technique
using the Quantum GIS (QGIS) software. Table 3.1 gives the summary statistics of the
continuous variables of home, neighborhood, and environmental attributes used in this
study. Considering the study period, the data cover 17 years, 2000 to 2016, featuring 70,619
sales transactions that occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky.
A. Lead Risk Data in the Context of Fayette Kentucky
Fayette County, a Commonwealth county in Kentucky, encounters the same concerns of
water challenges, including lead risks. Locals frequently ask questions about their drinking
water quality like “Why do we have cloudy or milky water? Why do we have brown or
yellow water? Is there lead in our water? What is the difference between hard and soft
water?", Kentucky American Water (2017).
“Because service lines, faucet fixtures, household pipes, and/or solder can
contribute significantly to the lead and copper levels in tap water, we ask our customers to
collect samples in their homes. These samples are collected on a routine basis (systems
begin by monitoring once every six months with reductions in sampling possible that allow
for monitoring once every three years) at homes that are considered vulnerable based on
when they were constructed, and the materials used. We do this monitoring according to
the requirements of the Lead and Copper Rule and use the results to confirm that our
corrosion control strategy is operating as intended.”
This quotation is a statement from Kentucky American Water, revealing that the water
system in Fayette County, or State at large, do encounter probable lead challenges.
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Kentucky has an active program to address lead. The program contains laws and
regulations on lead, including trainings, certifications, and investigations of lead
complaints. Although the average water quality in Fayette County, Kentucky is relatively
good, Fayette County, Kentucky presents an interesting variation in the study of lead
contamination. I do not have an actual information on lead contaminants in the Fayette
water systems. Nevertheless, this study uses an exogenous proxy called lead exposure risk,
collected from Vox Media, to account for the lead in Fayette County, Kentucky’s water
supplies. Lead-risk zones in Fayette County, Kentucky, structured at the Census Tract
level, varies from potentially low to high-risk areas, see Figure 3.2. Older neighborhoods
in Fayette County, Kentucky are rated as highly probable exposure zones, while newer
residential areas in the County are rated as low probable exposure zones. Homes in the
older sections of Fayette County might have lead pipes and solders, yet the search and
replace plan is undergoing, WKYT (2016). Vox teamed with epidemiologists from
Washington State’s Department of Health to estimate the risk levels in every geographic
area of the United States. The data is originally calculated from the Census data. Similar to
the United States, Fayette County, Kentucky is systematized into 10 lead-risk layers. In an
ascending order, 1 represents the lowest risk area, while 10 represents the highest risk area.
This exogenous proxy, lead exposure risk does not confirm that there is an actual lead
contaminant in a water supply. Instead, lead paint, the age of the house, and the poverty
rate are some of the attributing factors used by the researchers to construct the lead-risk
variable and applied by this study to indicate lead risk in the water supply.
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B. Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Data
Structural attributes data are necessary to control for the housing characteristics influence
on residential homes. The Housing transaction data is accredited to Fayette County,
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA). PVA collects and maintains
residential property data, and track ownership changes and update changing characteristics
of properties in the County. The PVA data provide information on home price, month and
year of the sales transaction, the year the home was built, the building square feet, garage
type, fixed and half bathrooms, and the property acreage. The sale price is the study
dependent variable. I adjust this price to accurately reflect the current market value of
homes, using 2016 consumer price index (CPI 2016 = 240.007).
The data analysis shows that homes are mostly sold at or above the average price
during the months of May, June, July, August, and September. June and July are the peak
months of sales. Respectively, about 11% of residential homes, over the study period, are
sold in June and July and sold above the average inflated price of $219,328. The slowest
sales months in Fayette County, Kentucky are January and February. January contributes
to the number of homes sold at 5% and February at 6%. Moreover, the peak sales in the
county occurred during the years of 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively at 8%, 8%, and
7%. These sales reveal the year fixed effects, as well as the relative economic times in those
years. An additional structural description showed that about 64% of homes in the study
period has attached garage, followed by homes with detached garage at 15% and homes
with no garage at 14%.
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Controlling for the neighborhood attributes, I collected data factors from the
Lexington government, including Fayette County Public School System (FCPS). The data
on neighborhood attributes were collected through the county’s open access data portal.
Presented in dichotomous variables, information on the neighborhood and the environment
include if the home is located within a historic district if it located within 0.1 miles to a
park, and if it is within 0.06 miles to a water network. Other neighborhood factors are the
associated elementary school district boundary, Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) area, and
the household median income at a Census Tract level. There are 17 local historic districts
included in the data. Being a place of cultural, historical, and environmental attractions,
historic districts may provide benefits to residential homeowners in the form of higher
property value and tax breaks. Homeowners in Fayette County, Kentucky also enjoy the
amenities of about 100 parks. The features in these parks range from the types of parks
such as community, golf-course, or neighborhood parks and recreational facilities like
aquatic centers, and multi-purpose trails. I observe that approximately 10% of the homes
in the data are waterfront properties. Waterfronts in Fayette County, Kentucky include
creeks, runs, tributaries, folks, and branches. In the same spirit of neighborhood factors, I
include 14 ZIP areas, about 33 elementary school districts, and the median household
incomes of Fayette County, Kentucky to control for potential influences on buyers and
seller’s decisions. ZIP code areas give forth the linked socioeconomic factors of a
neighborhood. Median income averaged at $57,559, might depict homeowner preference,
money constraint, and financial ability to address lead risk. The elementary school districts
control for the associated performance level on residential properties. Measured by the
average test score percentiles from 2011 to 2015, this study categorized the elementary
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districts by their average performance levels into Distinguished (90 – 100 percentiles),
Proficient (70 – 89 percentiles), or Needs Improvement (0 – 69 percentiles).
C. Analyzing Neighborhood Characteristics by Relative Lead Exposure Risk
For further data analysis, the lead-risk exposure zones are organized into two groups for
matching purposes. As shown in Figure 3.2, lead-risk level 6 to 10 are identified as
neighborhoods having the highest probability of lead exposure. This is my treatment group,
accounting for 37% of residential sales. Lead-risk areas in level 1 to 5 indicate areas with
the lowest probability of lead exposure. This zone represents the control group, accounting
for 63% of residential sales in Fayette County, Kentucky. At the 5% significance level,
Table 3.2 finds that variables in the two groups, treatment, and control, are statistically
different. For example, the average median income for homes in the high lead exposure
zones is $43,637 while the average median income for homes in the low lead-risk areas is
$65,722. Homes in the low exposure zone have an average age of 26 years, whereas homes
in the high exposure zone have an average age of 52 years.
VI.

Empirical Estimation

The equilibrium economic phenomena, as presented in Equation 11, underpins my general
model for the first phase of the analysis. In the first phase, I incorporate empirical strategies
of covariates, two-stage least squares (2SLS), and propensity score matching (PSM). These
methodologies allow for a comparable and robust analysis of the influence of lead-risk,
relative to the water supply, on the residential market. My study second phase focuses on
a sub-sample of a one-time resale of residential homes in Fayette County to check for an
asymmetric information relative to lead risk.
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A. Hedonic Valuation of Lead Risk Phase
My first empirical estimator forms a covariate approach to account for the implicit value
of lead risk. The inclusion of explanatory variables could determine an unbiased estimate
for my variable of interest. A linear hedonic functional form is chosen to estimate the
hedonic valuation of lead exposure risk. The linear function form, although susceptible to
omitted variable bias, will produce low mean percentage errors, Cropper et al. (1988) and
Kuminoff et al. (2010).
Pi = ẞ0 + ẞEEi + ẞHHi + ẞNNi + ẞYYi + εi

(16)

Equation 16 shows the relationship between the linear price P of household i, and the
vectors of structural characteristics H, and neighborhood and environmental attributes N.
E represents the proxy of lead-risk exposure to a house. Y is the household median income
based on the associated Census Tract. Variables in the structural vector include the age of
the home, square feet of the home, fixed and half bathrooms, story, property acreage, sale’s
month and year, and garage type. Neighborhood and environmental variables include if the
home is located within a historic district, the associated elementary district performance
level, and the home’s proximity to a water network or park. ε assumes the Gauss-Markov
conditions of the idiosyncratic errors.
My second empirical specification sketches an instrumental variable (IV) procedure
on Equation 16. Since this study does not have an actual variable for water quality, the twostage least squares (2SLS) approach, using strong instruments, is ideal to accurately
estimate the influence of water quality on a home price. The first stage regress lead
exposure risk E on the instruments of year prohibition dummy ϴi (i.e., if the home was
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built before 1998), the age of the house Ai, ZIP area Zi, and the median household income
Yi. The final instrumental term Φi is constructed through the interaction of the instrumental
variable.
E = γ0 + γ1ϴi + γ1Ai + γ2Zi + γ3Yi + γ4Φi + ui

(17)

In many States, such as Kentucky and Illinois, lead poisoning is pointed out through
the ZIP areas. Campaigns preventing children from lead poisoning do focus on ZIP areas
with high risk of lead. These areas are used in formulating the level of lead risk in
communities. Income is also instrumental in determining lead risks. Homes or
communities with low incomes may be vulnerable to lead poisoning. Living below the
poverty line, families and communities cannot finance or facilitate the replacement of lead
materials or prevent lead poisoning in their private water systems. These families might
hardly purchase water filters to treat their water supplies. The age of the home may also
contribute to a situation of no, low, or high lead exposure risk. Even though the 1986
amendments to the drinking water system prohibited the use of lead substances in public,
residential and nonresidential buildings, it was in the year 1996 it became illegal to use
lead materials. So, homes built up to 1997 may have a high likelihood of being exposed to
lead poisoning. In the final instrumental factor, the interaction term points out the
interdependencies among the variables which could substantially contribute to the
vulnerability of lead risk in the water system. These instruments justify the exogenous
decisions of whether a homeowner will purchase a home with a probable low risk of lead
in the water supply, or not.
Pi = ẞ0 + ẞÊÊi + ẞHHi + ẞNNi + ui
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(18)

Building on the covariate strategy in Equation 16, the predicted Ê in equation 17 is used as
a proxy for E in the second stage of the IV approach. My instruments may not be perfect
as it may be correlated with price. Even so, I assume that these variables are strongly
correlated with the endogenous variable, Ê. I also assume that the predicted lead risk
variable is uncorrelated with the error term ui.
Applying the dummies, which were constructed from the relatively low and highrisk lead neighborhoods, my final verification strategy for causality uses a propensity score
matching (PSM). The PSM approach assures that unexpected prediction can be removed
from the observations. Homes located in the relatively high-risk area are positioned as the
treatment group, while homes located in the relatively low lead exposure areas are joined
to the control group. Following Dawid (1979) conditional independence notation, T Џ X |
U, T is the treatment group and X and U respectively depict the observed and unobserved
covariates. An elementary hypothesis of the PSM states that the assigned treatment group
and the observed covariates are conditionally independent given the true propensity score.
X Џ T | ᴨ (X)

(19)

Equation 19, from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) theorem, assumes that a matched
treatment-control pair is homogeneous in the covariates ᴨ(X). That is, the treatment and
control homes in the lead risk zones will be matched based on the same distribution of X.
Matching the true propensity score will result in the observed covariates of structural,
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics being asymptotically balanced between
treatment and control groups.
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B. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Water Quality Phase
Addressing the concern of asymmetric information, I subscribe to empirical advice from
Kurlat and Stroebel (2015). These authors test for information asymmetries in the real
estate markets. My data is not perfect to conform to the predictions put forth by Kurlat and
Stroebel. An ideal dataset would present information on sellers and categorize the sellers
by their level of information, more informed versus less-informed. However, I compute
and test for asymmetric information through resale information. The resale value is a
summation of the structural characteristics, the attractiveness of the neighborhood and
environmental attributes, the loading factor of a house to its neighborhood, and
idiosyncratic shocks. In conformance with the arguments from Akerlof (1970) and Kurlat
and Stroebel (2015), at the time of resale, it is assumed that information about the value of
the home is known. Home sellers are likely to acquire better and plentiful information,
relative to knowledge on lead risk than potential buyers. For example, assuming that
current homeowners and sellers are rational, they use information from their local water
utilities and authorities like the EPA to get information on lead risks for their homes or
neighborhoods. In the case of an asymmetric information, ceteris paribus, homes in
relatively low-lead risk water zones might be better than is commonly known or reflected
in local housing price transactions. The same applies to the reverse. The reverse is: Homes
in high lead risk water neighborhoods are worse off than commonly known or reflected in
home sales. Thus, due to hidden-type information, relatively high-lead risk water
neighborhoods might be overrated or horizontally valued, compared to homes in the
relatively low lead risk water neighborhoods. Problems with water in homes may not
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disclose by home sellers. These assumptions facilitated the building of a deterministic
model, as formulated in Equation 18, to check for asymmetric information.
Æ𝑗 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑉1/𝑉0)1/𝑡 − 1

(20)

Æ represents the average appreciating rate of resale homes in low lead risk water
neighborhoods if j = 0, and average appreciating rate of homes in high lead risk water
neighborhood if j = 1. V1 is the resale price offered by the seller and V0 is the initial or
former price. t represents the number of time homeowners occupied the property or
engaged by the sellers. If Æ for low-risk water area is not statistically different from the
high-risk Æ or not vertically higher, this would suggest an asymmetric information on
water quality. Expressed differently, if the high-lead water risk Æ is higher and statistically
different from the averaged low-risk Æ, this would also imply an asymmetric information.
According to Kurlat’s predictions, informed buyers in the housing market are able to select
better homes at the same prices than uninformed buyers. With these means, informed
buyers will be willing to pay for quality structure homes in a better neighborhood. On the
contrary, uninformed buyers will be willing to pay more for houses in a relative overrated
neighborhood. Notwithstanding, uninformed buyers can buy homes in both underrated and
overrated neighborhoods. Again, I expect, on average, homeowners in high lead risk areas
may have little information on lead in their water supply compared to low lead risk
neighborhoods.
VII.

Result

This section provides findings for the lead risk hedonic valuation and gives a report for the
possibility of a hidden type information, with respect to water quality in Fayette County,
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Kentucky. Initially, in the hedonic valuation phase, I used the unit level of lead risk
exposure in the water supply as my variable of interest. The later stochastic and
deterministic models used the segmented high-risk (treatment group) and low-risk (control
group) zones variables. Results from the hedonic phase are compared to conventional water
quality studies. Findings from the test for asymmetric information are linked to Kurlat and
Stroebel (2015) to interpret uninformedness in the market.
A. Water Lead-Risk Influence on Residential Housing Price
Model 1, defined in Equation 16, allows this study to control for factors that might
influence house price and my implicit variable of interest, lead risk in water quality. This
specification permits us to determine housing values and the implicit water quality, as the
lead risk increase or decrease by a unit. The result of the OLS specification is presented in
Table 3.3. I used the robust error treatment to correct for functional and misspecification
errors. Given the robust treatment, I do not analyze the percent of variation explained by
the model. Still, I find an R-squared of 72% in Model 1.
I find an unexpected result for water quality in Model 1, as reported in Table 3.3.
Water lead-risk is not statistically significant at the p-value of 0.05. On this account, I reject
the hypothesis that good water quality influences the values of residential homes. A
background investigation, using a stepwise control technique, show that water quality
variable alone, and time fixed effects of months and years, do not have a strong goodness
of fit to explain the linear model. Water quality risk alone produced a significant result, but
an R-squared of 0.05; the inclusion of sales months produced an R-squared of 0.05, and
sales year, 0.06. Additionally, controlling for the structural, neighborhood, and
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environmental attributes increase the explanatory power of the model to 72%.
Nevertheless, the finding for the lead-risk variable was not statistically significant at 0.1 or
0.05 p-value.
I applied the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator to examine the robustness
of water quality risk. The 2SLS estimator modeled that the quality of water relative to lead
risk is identified by exogenous instruments, including house age, median household
income, lead prohibition fixed effects, and ZIP areas. Initial analysis of the instruments
showed a positive correlation between house age and water quality exposure level at 0.69,
and a negative correlation between median household income and water quality risk level
at 0.66. These findings indicate a respective positive and negative associations of water
risk with house age and median household income.
The coefficients of the instruments are statistically significant at 5% significance
level in the first stage of the IV estimator, except for ZIP area 40504. House age was
positive and statistically significant from zero. An increase in the age of the house increases
the level of lead risk in the water quality. An increase in the median income of household
results in a decrease in water quality risk, a negative and significant result. The result from
the second stage also produces an unexpected result of water quality risk, see Table 3.4 An
increase in water risk level increases property values. This estimate of water quality risk
level, valued at $164, is positive and non-significant at 5% significance level. Besides
interpreting the results from the 2SLS estimator, I perform post-estimation tests to evaluate
the uniqueness of the 2SLS estimator. First, I perform the test of endogeneity, where the
null hypothesis argues that the instrumental variables are exogenous. The robust chisquared and regression p-values were 0.6227, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis. This
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indicates that the instruments were exogenous in nature, and the control specification (the
OLS Model) did not suffer from endogeneity problems; it was not meant to treat water lead
risk as an exogenous variable and using the 2SLS was not necessary. Second, I test for the
strength of the 1st stage. I hypothesized that the instruments were weak. The partial Rsquared was 0.57, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments were weak. Finally, I
performed an over-identification (over-id) test for the 2SLS model on the null that the set
of instruments is valid, and the model is correctly specified. Findings from the over-id test,
at a p-value of 0.0000, reject the null. This indicates an overidentification of the 2SLS
model.
In the final model application, which aims to evaluate lead risk hedonic price, I
measure the consistency of the water lead risk estimate through the PSM model. Looking
back on Table 3.2, the simple ANOVA test showed that the covariates of the treatment and
control groups are statistically different. Obviously, these differences alarm the challenge
of confounding factors between the treatment and control groups. The second check for
confounders employed the standard difference test, using the standard deviations of the
covariates means. Results from the standard deviation test also validate the possibility of
confounders between the treatment and control groups.
At first, when I used the entire dataset of 70,619, I was unable to find a balanced
match between the treatment and control groups. I failed on multiple attempts, despite
trying techniques such as changing the functional form from linear to quadratic and cubic
function. I also failed when I applied a probit and logistic regressions, and matching
algorithm like the nearest neighborhood (NN) and Caliper & Caliper and Radius. For a
successful matching, I reassessed the data and chose 4,352 observations for the propensity
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score. Note that, I used only continuous variables in new data for the PSM. Along with the
property acreage control, all dichotomous covariates were dropped because these
covariates could not balance the groups, or they violated the matching overlapping
assumptions. I applied a probit regression on a common support matching algorithm to
estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated effect (ATT). I regressed the treated groups
on the covariates of age, age-squared, story, fixed and half bathrooms, and the median
income for the household at the Census Tract level.
Holding all other variables constant, while controlling for the structural
characteristics common to homes in the groups, Table 3.5 shows that there is a probability
that residential homes in the high lead water risk neighborhood is devalued by $11,1010.
This result, computed via the ATT model, is statistically significant. The conventional
expectation for water quality is satisfied: In this model, I fail to reject the hypothesis of a
higher willingness to pay to avoid lead-risk in a neighborhood water quality. The ATT
findings indicate an implicit negative value of neighborhoods or homes that are susceptible
to high lead-risk. Table 3.6, the balance table, and Figure 3.4, the balance plot, tabularly
and graphically represent the balanced matching. Primarily, the balance table ensures and
communicates that my covariates for the treatment and controls were not different to
promote confounding. Figure 3.4 visually reinforced Table 3.6 to show that my structural
covariates were not biased, and I can trust the ATT estimate for the water quality valuation,
in term of water lead risk. Approximately 29% of the sub-dataset (i.e., 1,289 observations)
was matched, while 71% of the data was untreated by the propensity estimator.
Unlike the OLS and 2SLS models which are positive and not significant, the PSM
estimate coheres with conventional findings on water quality. For instance, Leggett and
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Bockstael (2000) find a negative value for increased bacteria in water, and Piper (2003)
supports the argument that poor water quality leads to higher treatment cost and higher
water rates. I join and support the argument of a positive willingness to pay for good water
quality. Residents will positively value environmental attributes, including water quality
which is free from harm or negative externalities.
B. Asymmetric Information in Water Quality
Given that a residential home seller is not legally responsible to disclose water quality
problems of a home or neighborhood during a sale or resale, I expect that asymmetric
information for hidden lead risk in water quality might be present. This might be true,
especially for homes in the high-risk water neighborhoods. I constructed a deterministic
appreciation rate in Equation 20 to test for any sign of asymmetric information. Hence, I
compare the average resale appreciation rates between homes in the high-risk and homes
in the low-risk water neighborhoods. To achieve this measure, I first extract a subset of
18,984 observations from the data. These observations are the unique first resales that
occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky, considering the data period. During the data
cleaning process, I dropped all resales that happened less than six months of the previous
sales. Note, it is evident in the dataset that resale occurred up to eight times for some homes
in the county between 2000 and 2018.
Table 3.7 reports the findings from the deterministic test. The deterministic test
compared the average appreciation rates between the treatment and control groups.
Validated by the p-value of 0.05 in Table 3.7, I fail to reject the null expectation that, on
average, homeowners in high lead risk areas may have little information on lead in their
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water supply compared to low lead risk neighborhoods. Table 3.7 reports that homes in the
high-risk water neighborhoods have a vertical appreciation rate relative to homes in the
low-risk water zones, and these groups are statistically different from zero. The average
appreciation rate for a probable high-risk area is about 52% and the resale appreciation rate
for homes in the low-risk neighborhood is about 39%. The vertical difference in the
appreciation rate is 13%. This finding is consistent with Kurlat and Stroebel’s expectations
and results. Informed buyers are likely to use their information in an overrated
neighborhood, while uninformed buyers are incapable of distinguishing both the bad
qualities in both neighborhoods and homes. Hence, the deterministic test suggests the
presence of information asymmetries relative to residents who live in a high lead-risk water
neighborhood. The results imply that these residents are unable to detect, gain perfect
information, or pay attention to the revealed information which would then a give gist of
the level of lead risk in their water supplies. Although results from the deterministic model
may suggest the presence of asymmetric information, the results herein are potentially
biased because important independent and explanatory variables might have been left out
when I specified Equation 20. For example, adding the number of years homeowners or
sellers occupied residential homes to Equation 20, I could expect the average appreciation
rates to shift to the true values.
VIII.

Conclusion and Implications

I argue that residential homeowners will pay more for improved water quality, and
homeowners in the high lead risk water areas may have little information on their water
supply relative to low lead exposure neighborhoods. Nevertheless, during the time of
resale, home sellers are likely to obtain better information, relative to knowledge on lead
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risk, than potential buyers. I applied the hedonic analysis to empirically measure the effect
of lead risk on housing values. The OLS, 2SLS, and PSM specifications were employed to
validate the robustness of the implicit lead-risk value.
Accounting only for structural attributes, holding all things constant, I find that
homeowners in the relatively low-lead risk water communities are implicitly willing to pay
$11,101 to avoid the likelihood of being poisoned by lead. Analyzed in the deterministic
model of appreciation rate, I find that the average appreciation rate from the resale of homes
in the probable low-risk area (52%) is higher than the average appreciation rate for homes
in the low-risk neighborhood (39%) by 13%. This difference suggests, ceteris paribus,
buyers in the low-risk areas are better informed about lead risk than the high-risk buyers.
Acquiring a higher appreciation rate for homes in the high-lead risk neighborhood could
also imply that potential buyers are uninformed and incapable of distinguishing the quality
of high lead risks in water neighborhoods. Findings from my stochastic and deterministic
models may be vulnerable to empirical pitfalls and may violate regression assumptions,
including omitted variable bias. Future studies could detect omitted variables in this
research and add important variables to the models.
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IX.

Tables

Table 3.1. Summary Statistic of Continuous Variables of Structural Attributes,
Median Household Income and Water Lead-Risk Levels.
Variable
Observation
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Real Price (dollars)
70,619
$219,328 $148,676 $16,202 $5,649,844
House Age (years)
70,619
35
25
1
207
Home Size (square feet)
70,619
1,846
744
416
10,762
Story
70,619
1.4
0.5
1
3
Fixed Bathroom
70,619
2
1
1
10
Half Bathroom (unit)
70,619
0.5
0.5
0
4
Home acreage
70,619
0.2
0.2
0.002
9.8
Median Income
70,619
$57,559
$20,915
$12,288 $168,103
Lead Risk (unit)
70,619
4
3
1
10
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Table 3.2. Comparative Summary Statistics of Water Lead-Risk Treatment and Control
Groups

Variable

Low Lead Risk
Zone (Control
Group)
44,519 Homes

High Lead Risk
Zone (Treatment
Group)
26,100 Homes

T-Statistics (Pr(|T|
> |t|)

Mean
246111
2
26
2010

Mean
173643
7
52
1566

p-value
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***

Real Price (dollars)
Lead Risk (unit)
House Age (years)
Home Square Feet (linear
feet)
Story (unit)
1.5
1.3
Fixed Bathroom (unit)
2
2
Half Bathroom (unit)
0.6
0.3
Property acreage (acres)
0.23
0.20
Median Income (dollars)
65722
43637
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
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0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***

Table 3.3. Estimates of Hedonic Model (OLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water
Quality
Dependent variable real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $219,328, Std. Dev:
$148,676)
Variable
Estimate
Robust Std.
t-stat
p-value
Error
Water Quality (n=10 levels, μ
.204
.230
0.89
0.373
= 4)
House age (μ = 35)
-.237***
.045
-5.26
0.0000
Median Income (μ = $57,559)
.32***
.03
10.33
0.0000
Time fixed effects
Yes
House characteristics controls
Yes
Neighborhood fixed effects
Yes
School fixed effect
Yes
Observation
70,619
2
R
0.72
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.3 is a
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000.
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Table 3.4. Estimates of Hedonic Model (2SLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water
Quality
Dependent variable real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $219,328, Std. Dev:
$148,676)
Variable
Estimate
Robust Std.
t-stat
p-value
Error
Water Quality (n=10 levels, μ
.164
.234
.70
0.483
= 4)
Time fixed effects
Yes
House characteristics controls
Yes
Neighborhood fixed effects
Yes
School fixed effect
Yes
Observation
70,619
R2
0.70
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.4 is a
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000.
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Table 3.5. Propensity Score Matching Results for Treated Groups (High-Risk Areas)
Treated
Controls
Difference
S.E.
T-stat
Average Treatment on 182.820
193.921
-11.101
5.286
-2.10
Treated
Observation
1,289
2
Pseudo R
0.32
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.5 is a
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000.

Table 3.6. Balance Table for the Covariate Matching
Variable
Treated
Controls
Differen Bias
ce
Reduction
Age
53
53
-0.28
97.8%
Square Feet
1744
1746
2.7
97.7%
Story
1.2
1.2
-0.001
92.0%
Fixed Bath
2
2
0.0172
99%
Half Bath
.4
.4
-0.002
98.4%
Median Household Income
41.72
40.97
-0.749
95.9%
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
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P-value
0.460
0.436
0.574
0.917
0.937
0.074

Table 3.7. Testing for Asymmetric Information via the Average Appreciation
Rates between High and Low Water Lead-Risk Communities.
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: 40.86%, Std. Dev:
75%)

Water-Quality
Neighborhood
High-risk Pb
Exposure
(Level 6 – 10)
Low-risk Pb
Exposure
(Level 1 – 5)

Sample
(Obs.)

Mean
Appreciation

Std.
Dev.

3,897

52.47

49.65

[Confidence
Interval at 95%]
49.65 – 55.29

T-stat (Pvalue)
0.0000

4,558

38.97

37.09

37.09 – 40.85

Difference
13.50
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
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X.

Figures

Figure 3.1. Depicting the Assumption of Water Quality Information Asymmetries

Figure 3.1: Visually illustrating homes that may be prone to concealed lead risk
information in the residential market.
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Figure 3.2. Lead Risk Layers in Fayette County, Kentucky

Figure 3.2: A snapshot of lead risk map zoomed to Fayette, Kentucky. The map is
accredited to Rad Cunningham, Sarah Frostenson, and Vox media. Risk increases in
ascending order on the scale of 1 to 10.
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Figure 3.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Attributes Map

Figure 3.3: A cluster of residential home transactions in Fayette County over the period
2000 to 2016. Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates the physical neighborhood characteristics
that might influence the price of residential homes.
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Figure 3.4. Plotting the Matching between the Treatment and Control Groups
(Water Lead-Risk)

Plotting the Match between the Treatment and Control Groups
Age2

Age

Half bathroom

Square feet

Story

Fixed bathroom

Unmatched
Matched

Median income

-100

-50
0
50
100
Standardized % bias across covariates

150

Figure 3.4: The reference line portrays a region of no or less biasness at the critical value
of 0.05. Note: The p>chi2 for the Propensity Score Matching in Table 3.6 has a value of
0.637. This result also portrays and validates a balance between the treatment and control
groups.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
Environmental debates sprout from climate change to air pollution. This thesis is a
discourse on some of the common environmental issues confronted in the United States of
America. In this regard, I focused on the valuations of green spaces (namely, parks and
historic districts) and water pollution (in terms of lead contamination in the water supply).
The two essays in this thesis, on green space and water lead-risk, are connected by
the concept of the hedonic analysis. Throughout the essays, I use similar variables,
including structural, neighborhood, and environmental attributes, to implicitly measure
parks, historic districts, and lead risk levels in the water supply. The dataset, provided by
Fayette County, Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator, and the context of Fayette
County, Kentucky set the empirical stage to value the environmental issues of interests.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, showed how parks and historic districts play a key
role in the green space campaigns. These attributes are valued for their use-values. Parks
are used for health and recreation, hiking, picnicking, and serve as a cherished community
and diversified space. Besides preserving historic and cultural properties, historic districts
conserve the environment and support energy efficient policies. Despite the positive
environmental attributes that stream from parks and historically designated areas,
disapprovals or intruding concerns are raised to disclose the under-utilization and
underperformances of parks, and the gentrification and high costs that may be associated
with historic districts. Given these arguments on the positive and negative attributes of
parks and historic districts, I questioned the influence of parks and historic districts on
homeowners in order to disentangle their use-values. One should care about these use-
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values because parks and historic districts have the propensity to influence property values,
private investments, and budgetary financing.
So, in Chapter 2, I find that the willingness to pay for parks is negative, indicating
that parks host features which negatively affects their use-value. In the case where I
compare properties that have direct access to a park versus properties that lie across the
street and interacting parks with the featured amenities, I find a positive hedonic price for
parks. Hence, suggesting that parks have positive use values. Positive use-value in parks
may be linked to features like the type of park and recreational trails. On the other hand,
negative use-values may be linked to features like athletic fields which back noise or light
pollution. Given the mixed results, especially the negative valuation, I do not advocate for
the elimination of parks. Instead, I argue that parks and park amenities can be managed
efficiently to give the expected level of externalities and performances in today’s changing
environment. All findings show a positive influence of local historic district on the
residential markets, implying that positive environmental and economic benefits are
associated with local historic districts. Due to the findings that local historic districts have
an appreciated sales advantage over their immediate neighborhoods, I equate the result to
a spillover effect. Still, I did not carry out an adequate analysis to imply a gentrification
phenomenon.
The essay on lead-risk that may exist in the water supply is unearthed in Chapter 3.
The Flint, Michigan water crisis reverberated the lead contamination concerns in the United
States. Most States face serious lead risks, as EPA disclosed that only nine States report
safe levels of lead in their water supply. Identification of lead contamination, trusting the
reporting systems, and financing the replacement of lead infrastructures are significant
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problems in this area of water pollution. Prioritizing these problems, I focused on the
discussion of identifying lead-risk in the residential water supply. Identifying the risk lead
pollution in the water supply can be an unquestionable or a borderline case. Therefore, the
essay presented in Chapter 3 asks two research questions: First, what is the willingness to
pay to avoid lead exposure risk in a water supply system? Second, does information
asymmetries among homeowners in the residential market occur relative to their water
supplies? I evaluate the first question using a hedonic analysis. I assume that asymmetric
information is present for high lead-risk water areas because full disclosure of potential
lead risk in the water supply is not legitimately required during the sales of residential
properties. The second question is examined by a deterministic model, using an average
appreciation rate. Above all, potential lead risk in a water supply is important to discuss
due to the connected health and financing implications. For example, 10% to 20% of lead
intake in children are caused by water consumption, Rabin (2008).
In Chapter 3, I do not find a statistical result to indicate that homeowners may be
are willing to pay for homes to avoid water lead-risk. Holding all things constant, and
considering only housing characteristics and median household income, I find that
homeowners in the relatively low-lead risk water communities might implicitly value water
more to avoid the likelihood of being poisoned by lead. I could not incorporate other
variables because overlapping assumptions were violated. The cost of excluding controls
cause bias in this average treatment result. When I compared the average appreciation rates
of resale homes in the probable low and high-water risk areas, I find a higher average
appreciation rate for homes in the high-risk neighborhoods. This finding might imply that
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residents in the high-lead risk neighborhoods are uninformed and incapable of
distinguishing the quality of high lead risks in the water.
The discussions and conclusions inscribed in Chapter 2 and 3 recommend practical
implications given the respective findings. Considering parks, I recommend that parks’
authorities intentionally use surveys to detect and mitigate the negative use-values and
undesirable facilities. In terms of the historic districts, I call for the appropriate authorities
covering historic districts to adopt communications and interventions against gentrification
and to promote actions for integration. In the vein of lead risk in the water supply, I
recommend that local authorities should structure a communication system to identify and
disseminate the level of lead risk in water supplies. Also, these authorities should try to
make the full-disclosure of water problem a legitimate requirement, in conjunction with
the lead-paint full disclosure.
Finally, I recognize the need for future study or post-thesis research to address these
environmental issues, namely parks, historic districts, and water lead-risk. A future
research needs to conduct a contingency valuation directed at the public, as well as to
private homeowners who live in close proximity to parks, in order to capture the negative
use-values of park amenities. This step would advise and facilitate financing, technical,
and engineering solutions to address issues in parks. In Addition, I call for a study to
develop a model to specifically investigate the gentrification phenomena which might be
associated with historic districts. Most studies have found significant results in the local
historic district. However, these studies are weak in explicitly modeling gentrification
issues. Lastly, a future research needs to construct a data to account for buyers and sellers
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informedness in the residential market through a stochastic approach in order to investigate
asymmetric information relative to lead risk in water supplies.
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